Bloggfrslur mnaarins, gst 2010

Hva me etta fyrirtki sem kallar sig "ECA Program"?

Eins og einhverjir tku eftir, komu frttir Financial Times, um tlanir fyrirtkisins ECA Program, a setja upp hr landi, astu fyrir nokkurn fjlda Sukhoi SU-27 Flanker vla.

En, eins og ur hefur komi fram frttum hrlendis, er tlun ess a sgn a r vlar veri vopnaar og einungis notaar jlfunarskyni.

Heyrst hefur, a r veri notaar sem svokallaar "agressor" vlar, en a eru vlar er leika vininn, egar veri er a fa herflugmenn.

Hr fyrir nean m sj mynd afSukhoi SU-27 Flanker vl.

Sukhoi Su-27 fighters
ECA has agreed to buy up to 33 Sukhoi Su-27 fighters

Frttir FT.com

Cold war base to be private Top Gun school

Iceland set to embrace war-game fliers

Sj upplsingar um Sukhoi SU-27 Flanker

En, svo a gamla Su-27 grunngerin s tknilega relt dag, er enn veri a selja raar afleiddar gerir, sem kallast t.d. Su-35. En, er bi a endurnja allan innri tknibna og skipta fyrir mun fullkomnari, en a ytra tliti .e. sjlfur bkurinn er nokkurn veginn hinn sami, og ar me einnig flugeiginleikar - hrai - dgi o.s.frv.

etta ir, a ef ECA Program raunverulega tekst a tvega sr essar flugvlar, eru eir sennilega komnir me .s. flugherir va um heim, munu sj sem hugavert tilbo, .e. a geta jlfa sig gegn flugvlum er hafa fullkomlega samkeppnishfa flugeiginleika og "overall performance" vi nlegar vlar.

"ECA Program says it has already signed up five air forces keen to test their pilots and jets against an aircraft most commonly flown by the Russian and Chinese militaries. "

a m segja, a veri jlfunin lkari v sem eir geta tt von , alvru bardaga. Betri a v leiti.

A v leiti, verur sennilega a sj etta sem hugavera viskipta hugmynd, hj ECA Program.

En geta eir raunverulega tvega sr essar vlar?

a fer eitthva tvennum sgum af v - sbr.

"We are the car rental service of the military training world, said Melville ten Cate, ECAs Dutch co-founder."

"According to Mr ten Cate, ECA has agreed to buy 15 Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker jets from BelTechExport, a Belarusian arms export company, with the option of 18 more. If completed, it would be the biggest sale of fighter aircraft to a private buyer and the first large-scale import of Russian-made warplanes into a Nato country."

"BelTechExport denied knowledge of the deal on Monday, having previously confirmed it to the Financial Times. An official at the Belarusian agency responsible for approving arms exports said he was not aware of it and Rosoboronexport, the Russian state arms exporter, denied involvement."

"According to Mr ten Cate, the aircraft were originally made in Russia and will be upgraded in Belarus, with the first delivery in October."

hinn bginn, hafandi huga spillinguna Rsslandi og Hvta Rssland er rugglega ekki betra - arf ofangreind neitun ekkert a a, a dllinn s ekki raunverulega gangi.

En, a m vera a einhver s a reyna einfaldlega a krja t hrri mtur, fyrir a heimila a salan fari fram.

.e. a minnsta kosti ekki hgt a fullyra, a ECA Program s einhver tlsn. hinn bginn, s sama tma ef til vill ekki rtt, a treysta essu alveg 100% heldur.

venjulegur samningur

g vek aftur athygli essu -

"If completed, it would be the biggest sale of fighter aircraft to a private buyer and the first large-scale import of Russian-made warplanes into a Nato country."

a segir ekkert endilega a etta s elilegt, en klrlega er dllinn mjg venjulegur.

Srstaklega verur merkilegt, a ef starfsemi af essu tagi fr a fara fram hr landi, er a auvita einnig mjg srstakt, ljsi ess a sland hefur engan flugher n her af nokkru tagi.

g held samt a vi slendingar sum mjg sveigjanlegir hva etta varar - en bent hafi veri a ECA hafi ekki fengi starfleyfi Kanada, ir a ekki endilega a vi eigum alls ekki a veita a.

etta er einfaldlega kvrun er vi verum a taka sjlf okkar eigin forsendum, en sjlfur hef g ekki hyggjur af v eirri forsendu a etta su "demilitarized" hernaarvlar.

a vekur mr ekki heldur neinar svefntruflanir, a ECA Program er fyrirtki sem hefur atvinnu af v, a starfa fyrir heri ti um heim, en a skv. vefsu fyrirtkisins bur upp flugjlfun og einnig stendur a flutningum fyrir , vst einhvern flota af gmlum herflutningavlum.

En ekki vilja eir kannast vi, a taka nokkru sinni tt bardgum.

En g er einfaldlega sammla v, a herir sem slkir .e. tilvist eirra, s nokkrum skilningi rng.

En, .s. svokallair friarsinnar gleyma, er a her er endanum trygging hverrar jar er rekur her, gegn v a einhver nnur j ris inn, taki eirra aulyndir herskildi - jafnvel landi.

En, n sns lands og n sinna aulinda, er ti um vikomandi j - hennar afkomendur vera heimilislausir.

Me rum orum, her er eli snu trygging jar fyrir ryggi og lfsafkomu afkomenda sinna.

j hefur a sjlfsgu rtt til a verja lfsafkomu sinna afkomenda! Slkt getur kosta mannfrnir!

Slkt er ekki rttmtt! Ekki rangt! Ekki mannlegt - ef t a er fari!.

Niurstaa

annig a g bls mralskar stur gegn v, a heimila starfsemi ECA Program.

En, a sjlfsgu a fara varlega samningum a.m.k. anga til a ljs kemur hvort fyrirtki raunverulega getur stai vi au pln sem talsmenn ess hafa lst yfir, ea hvort etta voru bara draumsnir eftir allt saman!

Ef hinn bginn etta raunverulega er raunhft, s g ekkert a v a heimila essa starfsemi. a vera einfaldlega til strf Keflavkurflugvelli - og Suurnesjum er vst versta atvinnuleysi landinu eftir allt saman!

Kv.


Hver er sannleikurinn varandi virur um aild a Evrpusambandinu?

Hinar lagaformlegur krfur sem Evrpusambandi setur, sem rki er ska aildar vera a uppfilla, eru settar fram Sttmlanum um Evrpusambandi - annars vegar - og - hins vegar - svoklluum Kaupmannahafnar kvum.

Sj fyrst au kvi Sttmlans um Evrpusambadi er kvea um skilyri er n aildarrki skuli uppfylla:

THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Article6

1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.

2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.

3. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.

4. The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies.

Ekkert kvi 6 hljmar augljslega hrilega, .e. ESB segist vera mynda utan um tiltekin prinsippi, .e. viringu fyrir; mannrttindum, frelsi, lri, lrttindum, stjrnun skv. lgum o.s.frv. Vsa er til Rmarsttmlans fr 1950 og au rttindakvi sem ar eru tiltekin, a au su heiri hf. San a jareinkenni hvers melimarkis su virt. San, a lokum eins kvi sem m huga hva akkrat er tt vi, en a segir a ESB skuli afla sr bjarga til a n fram snum markmium og til ess a framkvma sn stefnumi. a kvi er mjg greinilega teyjanlegt.

Article49

Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members.

The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

Skv. kvi 49, hefur srhvert Evrpurki er sem ber viringu fyrir eim prinsippum sett fram kvi 6 rtt til a skja um aild. S umskn skuli send til Leitogarsins, sem eftir a hafa rgast vi Framkvmdastjrnina og fengi samykki Evrpuingsins, skal komast a sameiginlegri niurstu.

Skilyri aildar og s algun eirra sttmla sem eru grunnur ESB sem slk aild felur sr (en aildarsamningur hvers rkis verur alltaf hluti af sttmlum sambandsins), skuli vera h samkomulagi milli melimarkjanna og umsknarlands. a samkomulag er san h stafestingu srhvers rkis er aild a samkomulaginu (.e. ll melimarki ESB) samrmi vi skilyri sett stjrnarskr hvers og eins eirra.


kvi 49 skilgreinir sem sagt samning um aild sem samning rkis er skar aildar vi ll aildarrki ESB.

Eins og etta kvi ltur t, mtti halda a samingur geti veri um hva sem er!

En .e. ekki alveg annig.

svoklluu Kaupmannahafnar kvi var nnar kvei um skilyri au sem au rki er ska aildar veri a uppfylla - au kvi gilda!

The Copenhagen Criteria

The Copenhagen European Council held in June 1993 spelt out the conditions for EU membership known as the Copenhagen Criteria. These require that candidate countries have:

  • stable institutions to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (political criterion);
  • a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU's internal market (economic criterion);
  • the ability to take on all the obligations of membership, i.e. the entire body of EU law and policy known as the acquis communautaire, and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (acquis criterion).

At the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, it was decided that compliance with the political criterion agreed in Copenhagen was a prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations. By contrast, the economic criterion and the ability to fulfil all the obligations of membership (acquis criterion) were to be assessed in a "forward-looking, dynamic way".

The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration of both the Union and the candidate countries. The issue of the EU's absorption capacity is assuming ever greater importance as its membership grows and so it is a special focus of the Negotiating Frameworks for Turkey and Croatia and was emphasized in the European Council conclusions of 15/16 June 2006.

Last updated 07.04.2009

Lykilkvi er a sjlfsgu kvi um svokalla "acquis communautaire."

.s. a ir, er a rki er skar aildar, veri a vera frt um a undirgangast .e. taka upp sem eigin lg, ll lg og reglur ESB, og stjrnsslu- og laga- og dmahefir. etta er .s. einu orir er oft kalla "the acquis" ea samykktir ef frasinn er ddur beint.

Nokkrir bloggarar hafa vaki athygli leibeiningarbklingi sem Framkvmdastjrnin hefur gefi t, .s. almenningur einstkum rkjum getur sjlfur kynnt sr reglur ESB um stkkunarferli:

a skjal virist setja fram hlutina me einstaklega skrum og skilmerkilegum htti.

Understanding Enlargement

  • When a country applies to join the EU, the Member States governments, represented in the Council,
    decide after receiving an opinion from the Commission whether or not to accept the application
    and recognise the country as a candidate.
  • Similarly, the Member States themselves decide when and on what terms to open and to close accession negotiations with candidates on each policy area.
  • And it is the Member States who decide when accession negotiations are satisfactorily completed.

arna kemur mjg skrt og skilmerkilega fram, a a eru aildarrki sem raunverulega ra v hver fr aild. Aildarsamningur er milli aildarrkja eirra er fyrir eru og ess rkis sem skar aildar.

Framkvmdastjrnin sr san um samningavirur fyrir hnd aildarrkjanna.

Understanding Enlargement

  • The draft Accession Treaty has to be agreed upon and signed by every Member State and the candidate concerned before the latter becomes an acceding country.
  • It then has to be ratified by each Member State and the acceding country according to their own constitutionally established procedures.
  • The European Parliament, whose members are elected directly by the EUs citizens, also has to give its consent.

A lokum arf aildarsamningur samykki og a auki stafestingu srhvers aildarrkis, auk samykkis Evrpuingsins.

Understanding Enlargement

  • First, it is important to underline that the term negotiation can be misleading.
  • Accession negotiations focus on the conditions and timing of the candidates adoption, implementation and application of EU rules some 90,000 pages of them.
  • And these rules (also known as acquis, French for that which has been agreed) are not negotiable.
  • For candidates, it is essentially a matter of agreeing on how and when to adopt and implement EU rules and procedures.
  • For the EU, it is important to obtain guarantees on the date and effectiveness of each candidates implementation of the rules.

Skrara er ekki mgulega hgt a ora etta - .e. samningavirur um aild snast um me hvaa htti og hvaa tmaramma, rki er skar aildar tekur upp lg og reglugerir ESB samtals 90.000 bls.

Sjlf lgin og r reglur sem veri er a semja um aild a, eru fyrir utan ramma ess sem hgt er a semja um.

Fyrir ESB s tgangspunkturinn s a f fram tryggingar og dagsetningar.

Samningavirur um aild:

a hugavera er, a eins og virum er htta dag, er samningavirum um aild a regluverki ESB, en .e. .s. raunverulega er veri a ra um aild a, skipt 35 kafla.

Samningavirur dag fara fram kafla fyrir kafla.

Ekki er hgt a hefja virur um nsta kafla eftir fyrr en gengi hefur veri fr v hvernig algun vikomandi rkis skal fara fram a kvum laga ESB eim sem tilheyra eim kafla sem veri er a semja um hverju sinni.

Kafla er loka, egar samningamenn Framkvmdastj. kvitta upp a hann s klraur, san er etta sent til hfustva Framkvmdastj. sem eftir nnari skoun .s. kvitta er upp , etta er san einnig sent til Rherrarsins og Evrpuingsins. Ef r stofnanir eru einnig sammla, telst virum um ann kafla loki.

etta arf a gera hvert skipti fyrir srhvern hinna 35 kafla.

Eins og sst, er etta tafasmt ferli og hvert sinn, .e. hvert hinna 35 skipta, hafa Bretar og Hollendinga mguleika til a segja "Nei" ea tefja mli, ef eir eru ekki sttir vi hvernig horfir um virum um Icesave mli.

egar samningavirur fara fram um hvern einstakann kafla, eru eftirfarandi valmguleikar til staar fyrir vora rkisstj.- etta er tmandi listi.

  • sland getur kvei a taka upp einhlia au kvi lg sem bent er a upp vanti a lgfesta, svo skilyrum um algun a lgum ESB innan vikomandi kafla s fullngt. etta vri algun mean samningaferli er gangi, .e. ur en endanlegur samingur er klraur.
  • sland getur sami um, a tilteknar breytingar slenskum lgum sem fari er fram , komi til framkvmda um lei og aildarsamningur tekur gildi.
  • A lokum, getur sland sami um, a breytingar slenskum lgum taki gildi sar meir, .e. ekki um lei og samingur tekur gildi, heldur skv. umsmdum tmaramma um algunarfrest a vikomandi kvum laga ESB.

Mig grunar a, a Samfum muni finnast a freystandi - a innleia lg eins fljtt og aui er, eins miki af eim kvum sem ESB bendir a urfi a gera a sl. lgum, og eir telja sig framast komast upp me.

.e. einhlia upptaka eirra kva.

En ekkert bannar a slkt s gert.


Skoum aeins hva Stkkunarstjri ESB sagi fyrr sumar:

Enlargement commissioner Stefan Fuele -

  • Mr. Fule said that the commission, the EU's executive, would begin a detailed screening of Iceland's laws in November,
  • and hopes to finish the process and identify where changes are needed by next summer.
  • ""This does not mean that it is going to be an easy ride. Issues are there, like fisheries, agriculture and food safety,""
  • Individual chapters can be opened for negotiations between the EU member states and Iceland after the screening procedure is complete.
  • EU legislation covers 35 different areas, known as chapters, ranging from the justice and home affairs to environment, energy, social and transport policy.

a er ekki kja langt nvember, sem skv. Fuele er egar svokallair rnifundir embttismanna fr Framkvmdastjrninni og sl. embttismanna munu hefjast.

Fuele tlar a essi samanburur milli gildandi sl. laga og reglugera og gildandi laga og reglugera ESB, muni standa fram nsta sumar.

essum fundum fer sem sagt fram mjg nkvm greiningarvinna, og fundi verur t hva .e. akkrat sem upp vantar gildandi sl. lg og reglugerir svo r uppfylli ann standard er settur er af gildandi lgum og reglugerum ESB.

egar essari greiningarvinnu er loki, verur komi fram hverju arf a breyta og srfringar Framkvmdastjrnarinnar skv. eim ggnum munu semja rniskrslu, sem eir munu senda til sinna hfustva .s. hn verur skou nnar. Ef hn fr n yfirmanna Framkvmdastj. eru niurstur Framkvmdastj. lagar fyrir aildarrkin.

ll aildarrkin urfa svo a samykkja a au su stt vi r niurstur, og einungis ef a samykki fst fram, er hgt a hefja formlegar samningavirur me opnun fyrsta kaflans af 35.

Aildarrkin geta ef eim snist svo, sett fram af sinni hlfu opnunarskilyri fyrir hvern kafla fyrir sig (opening benchmark). etta er mjg lkegur gambttur af hlfu Breta og Hollendinga.

Skv. eim orum er utanrkisrherra Belgu vihafi fyrr sumar, egar Belga var forsti fyrir rki ESB, virist a opnunarskilyri su mjg - mjg lkleg:

'Historic day' as Iceland starts EU membership talks begin!

Belgian Foreign Minister Steven Vanackere - "There are some issues to be settled and we will of course encourage Iceland to take them into account," - ""Think of the environment, think of whale hunting, think of the financial sector, the discussion on Icesave," - ""The chapter of the obligations on the financial level will have to be dealt with. If you ask me how crucial it is, then when everything else is settled and one thing isn't settled, this last thing becomes crucial. If we can settle it earlier, it's less crucial,"" -""exactly the same kind of scrutiny and seriousness as any other candidate," said Vanackere. The process is expected to take at least 12 to 18 months, as the northern nation brings its laws in line with EU standards."

Mia vi etta, og hafandi einnig huga niurstu leitogafundar ESB ann 17. jn sl.:

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Brussels, 17 June 2010 - bls. 10

24. The European Council welcomes the Commission opinion on Iceland's application for membership of the EU and the recommendation that accession negotiations should be opened. Having considered the application on the basis of the opinion and its December 2006 conclusions on the renewed consensus for enlargement, it notes that Iceland meets the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and decides that accession negotiations should be opened.

25. The European Council invites the Council to adopt a general Negotiating Framework. It recalls that negotiations will be aimed at Iceland integrally adopting the EU acquis and ensuring its full implementation and enforcement, addressing existing obligations such as those identified by the EFTA Surveillance Authority under the EEA Agreement, and other areas of weakness identified in the Commission's Opinion, including in the area of financial services. The European Council welcomes Icelands commitment to address these issues and expresses its confidence that Iceland will actively pursue its efforts to resolve all outstanding issues. The European Council confirms that the negotiations will be based on Iceland's own
merits
and that the pace will depend on Iceland's progress in meeting the requirements set out in the negotiating framework, which will address i.a. the above requirements.

er vart vi ru a bast en v, a aildarrkin muni setja fram sn eigin opnunar-skilyri .e. "opening benchmark".

Virum vi ESB er loki egar sasta kaflanum af 35 hefur veri loka.

Niurstaa

Eins og llum tti a vera ljst eftir lestur essa, snast virur um aild eingngu um me hvaa htti og skv. hvaa tmaramma sland getur a fullu og llu teki upp lg og reglur ESB. ar um eru alls engar undantekningar boi. Ekki er hgt a semja sig fr nokkrum hluta laga ea regla ESB.

  • .s. etta ir, a hva .e. sem sland vill f fram virum, urfa okkar samningamenn a sannfra mtaila vi samningabori - sem er ekki bara Framkvmdastj. heldur einnig aildarrkin og Evrpuingi, um a .s. sland vill f fram rmist innan "the acquis" .e. laga og regla sambandsins.
  • sland getur eingngu fengi eitthva fram sem rmast innan "the acquis" ea laga og regla sambandsins.

A auki tti llum a vera ljst, a Bretar og Hollendingar hafa ng af tkifrum til a tefja samingaferli, .e. hvert sinn egar kafla er loka arf til ess samykki allra aildarrkja.

A auki, hafa eir tkifri til a f hin aildarrkin til a samykkja a svokllu opnunarskilyri veri sett vi tiltekna kafla vntanlegs aildarsamnings jafnvel alla ef v er a skipta, .e. a n ess a au su uppfyllt fist vikomandi kafli ea kaflar ekki klrair me formlegum htti.

Mia vi oralag yfirlsingar leitoga aildarrkjanna fr v sumar, og ekki sst m sj dmi um au vihorf afstu utanrkisrherra Belgu fr v sumar; verur fastlega a reikna me v a opnunarskilyri veri sett.

g hugsa a atrialistinn sem Vanackere nefndi muni fara inn, .e.:

  • Icesave.
  • Hvalveiar.
  • Hver veit, ef til vill makrlveiar.
egar reynir etta, m fastlega reikna me a Samfar muni leggja til, a Icesave veri leyst skv. vilja Breta og Hollendinga, a hvalveium veri htt og ef a skilyri dkkar inn einnig, a makrlveium veri htt.
Kv.

Evra ea krna?

Til skringar minni afstu, var g eftir hruni 2008 og framan af ri 2009 eirrar skounar, a heppilegt gti veri a taka upp Evru ea Dollar hr einhlia. a var meira a segja stofnaur flagsskapur hugamanna um dollaravingu, sem g kom smvegis nlgt tmabili.

San, hef g smm saman fjarlgst hugmyndir um einhlia upptku annars gjaldmiils, en enn hlt g fram a samsinna v, a hugsanlega hefi veri betra fyrir okkur, a ef sland hefi gengi ESB og teki upp Evru 10. ratugnum.

.s. san olli straumhvrfum um afstu mna er tvennt, .e. koma nbelsverlaunahagfringsins Joseph Eugene Stiglitz hinga til lands fyrir um tpu ri - hlusti endilega hann hrna!. Hann rlagi eins og frgt var snum tma okkur a halda krnunni. Seinni atbururinn var egar vandrin hfust Grikklandi, en kjlfari fr g a kynna mr rt vandra Grikklands me lestri erlendra hagfrigreina, en ekki bara Grikklands heldur einnig skoai g einnig greinar um vandri Spnverja, greinar sem tldu a vandri svokallara jaarrkja ESB vri a mrgu leiti af smu rtum spunninn.

Punkturinn er, a au vandri a mrgu leiti lkjast tpskum sl. efnahagsklrum. .e. einmitt .s. g ttai mig , sem a sjlfsgu geri mr ljst a aild a Evru vri engin vrn gegn v a slk klur myndu vera framkvmd af okkar mnnum sar meir.

San var mr lka ljst, af lestri allra essara hagfrigreina, a kostnaur eirra aildarrkja Evrunnar sem eru verstu efnahags- og skuldavandrunum, verur mjg sennilega umtalsvert meiri en okkar slendinga, enmitt vegna ess a au lnd eru me Evru.

Eftir a hafa tta mig essu, skil g dag, a Evran einfaldega hentar hvorki sl. hagkerfinu n eim standard efnahagsstj. sem tkast hr.

Lklegasta niurstaan myndi vera, a sland fyrir rest myndi lenda enn verri kreppum en ur, .e. trma myndi versna. Efnahagsklur rlands, Spnar og Grikklands - er eins og hr lentu bluhagerfum, myndi vera forskrift eirra vegferar er lklegust myndi vera.

Niurstaan, a sland veri a ba vi eigin gjaldmiil fram - um langa hr, v forsendur ess a skipta um gjaldmiil su:

  1. slenskir stjrnmlamenn lri loks hagstjrn.
  2. A sl. framleisluhagkerfi s betrumbtt strum.

Hvorugt tel g vera hgt a laga me skjtum htti!

S etta sem 30 ra prgramm!

Efnahagskreppan Evrpu var hjkvmileg!

Spurt er: a er efnahagskreppa hinum vestrna heimi og annig hafa lnd me veikan og skuldsettan efnahag ori illa ti. a eru bi lnd innan EB (eins og Grikkland, Spnn og rland) og utan EB eins og okkar stkra ylhra. Bst vi a a s ekkert endilega Evrunni a kenna.

Sko vandinn er sumu leiti Evrunni a kenna. Alls ekki a llu leiti. En mli er, a ef starfar innan Evrunnar verur itt atvinnulf a vera samkeppnishft vi atvinnulf skalandi.

http://einarbb.blog.is/users/72/einarbb/img/eurozone_labor_costs.jpg

Taki eftir myndinni a ofan hvernig skaland sasta ratug hlt niri launakostnai heima fyrir. .s. gerist san hinum lndunum, var a eirra atvinnulf var vaxandi mli minna samkeppnishft um ver vi vru framleidda skalandi. etta leiddi til ess, a sasta ratug skapaist viskiptahalli milli margra rkja Evrusvisins og skalands.

etta er kalla "current account imballance" og a mati margra hagfringa er etta jafnvgi mjg alvarleg gnun vi tilvist Evrunnar -og strsti orsakavaldur kreppunnar. Reyndar tti a einnig vi Frakkland a ar skapaist einnig sambrilegt jafnvgi, en nst eftir jverjum voru Frakkar me strsta viskiptahagnainn vi nnur lnd Evrusvis.

stan kreppunnar er s, a egar r eftir r kaupir inn meira en selur, safnar skuldum. .s. gerist reynd var a lndin me viskiptahallann tku ln fyrir hallanum einna helst Frakklandi og skalandi, en eirra bankar voru einmitt fullir af peningum vegna ess a f streymdi sfellt inn Frakkland og skaland.

Punkturinn er, a egar annar ailinn safnar bara skuldum og hinn ailinn safnar bara eignum, er kreppa hjkvmileg fyrir rest. Hn hefi skolli hjkvmileg seinna ef kreppan er hfst Bandar. hefi ekki veri trigger moment.

Vandinn er ekki sst s, a skuldir rkjanna er skulda frkkum og jverjum eftir ralng viskipti eru samanlagt ngilega miklar, til a setja bankakerfi hvors rkis um sig algerlega hliina. r upphir eru mun strri snium en bjrgunarsjur ESB s hinn frgi.

S sjur var ekki settur til a bjarga rkjunum suri, heldur til a bjarga bnkunum rku rkjunum norri.

Vi urfum a bta lfskjr me v a auka vermti okkar tflutnings

Spurt er: Vi getum hglega ori undir og lent v a ba vi lleg lfskjr. Launakjr hrlendis eru ekki me eim betri.

Sko grunnvandi okkar er s a fyrir utan l flytjum vi nr eingngu t fisk. Vandinn vi fisk, er a etta er matvara og .e. raunverulegt ak v hve dr fiskur getur veri.
.s. a fer einnig saman, a fiskmeti krefst nokkurs fj. vinnandi handa, einfaldlega er ekki mgulegt a standa undir mjg hum launum - period.
Lausnin til ess, a hkka hrlendis almennt launastig, er a hkka tkni- og vermtastig okkar tflutnings.
g treysti mr a fullyra a etta er eina leiin. etta hefur ekkert me gjaldmiil a gera, heldur au raunvermti sem eru skpu. a eru au sem standa undir llu.

annig a ef vi viljum meira, urfum vi a auka innkomuna.

Lgt vermtastig okkar tflutnings er hluti af stu ess a erfitt verur fyrir okkur a ba vi annan gjaldmiil en okkar eigin!

Spurt er: Einar skil g ig rtt a telur a slenska krnan geti vel gagnast okkur framtinn a gefinni eirri forsendu a rkisfjrml su lagi ?

Akkrat og a auki mn rkstudda skoun er a a geri hagstjrn erfiari a ba vi annan gjaldmiil en okkar eigin. annig, a a s frumforsenda ess a annar gjaldmiill komi til greina, a s g hagstj.

Reyndar, tel g fleiri atrii urfa a koma til - en, mr snist einnig vera erfitt samkeppnisumhverfi innan Evrusvis fyrir okkur, mean aaltflutningur okkar heldur fram a vera nr eingngu fiskur.

etta kemur til vegna ess, a .s. r vrur hafa tiltlulega lg ver styur s framleisla treglega mjg h laun. .s. vi urfum er framleisla er hefur hrri virisauka og styur v hrra launastig.

stan ess a etta er vandkvi tengt spurningunni um krnu vs. Evru er s, .s. framleisla okkar er tiltlulega lg virisauka skiptir veri gjaldmilinum tiltlulega miklu mli fyrir a hvort vi erum samkeppnishf um ver, a a svo er sst hve sgulega s okkar tflutningi hefur treka hnigna hratt hvert sinn sem vergildi krnunnar hefur roki upp fyrir olmrk tflutningsins. essu hefur hinga til alltaf veri hgt a kippa liinn me gengisfellingu.

Ef vi aftur mti vrum me hvirisauka framleislu eins og t.d. skaland hefur, er veri gjaldmilinum minna hlutfall heildarvers fyrir vruna og valda verveiflur gjaldmilinum minna tjni tflutningnum, g helst vi versveiflur upp vi.

annig, a hvirisauka tflutningur myndi einnig auvelda okkur mjg a ba vi annan gjaldmiil en krnu.

Er krnan of ltil til a geta rifist sem sjlfst eining markai?

Spurt er: Ef gengi verur aftur gefi frjlst, er etta a ltill gjaldmiill a smilega str gjaldeyrirspeklant (vogunarsjur o.a.) ti heimi geta rugla gengi sl kr upp og niur.

Varandi .s. sagir um krnuna, ver g eiginlega a setja hlutina anna samhengi. En, ef vi myndum okkur a og vinur inn eigi sitthvort fyrirtki. itt hefur skila gu milliuppgjri og hefur nveri gert hagkvmann slusaming. mean fyrirtki eigu vinar ns, skilai lakara milliuppgjri .s. a var undir samkeppninni um samninginn.

N myndum okkur a vogunarsjur s a skoa markainn, en bi fyrirtki eru skr markai, hvort fyrirtki myndu eir sennilega veja a ess brf myndu lkka?

etta hi sama vi um rki eins og um fyrirtki, en lta m gjaldmiil sem hlutabrf, .e. hann hkkar veri egar vel rar en lkkar egar lla. Allt skv. elilegum markaslgmlum.

N sjir eins og jair a, eir eru alltaf httunum eftir eim, sem virast a eirra mati vera ofmetnir a markasviri, annig a eir geti grtt a veja fall eirra brfa ea gjaldmila vergildi.

etta er raun og veru nkvmlega sama umhverfi h skala. Strin hefur ekkert me a a gera, hvort A ea B hafi betri tilvistargrundvll alveg me sama htti og sm fyrirtki halda fram a vera til innan um risana.

----------------------

Lykilinn a gu gengi snst um gann rekstur, annig a uppgjrin og framtarforsendur su alltaf gar.

sr enginn hag v a veja fall, v einhver annar mun veita v athygli a vikomandi gjaldmiill ea hlutir eru undirverlagir og veja ess sta a eir hkki. En slk veml tkast lka.


Niurstaa

Byggjum upp okkar tflutningshagkerfi, en .e. .s. raunverulega stendur undir llu hrna, hvort sem .e. rki og laun greidd ar, ea atvinnulfinu - launum greiddum ar.

etta er sra einfalt, ef vi getum umbreytt okkar tflutningi smm saman yfir a a vi flytjum t dran, eftirsttann varning - um lei munum vi geta borga fyrir aukna jnustu vi okkur sjlf .e. almenning og a auki hrri laun.

etta hefur ekkert me spurninguna me gjaldmila a gera, heldur au grunnvermti sem hr eru skpu.

sama tma urfum vi a bta hr hagstjrn, svo a hagstjrnin raunverulega tempri sveiflur - annig a reglulegar gengisfellingar veri smm saman eitthva sem gerist fortinni - en ekki lengur.

essa tti verum vi a lagfra sjlf. a mun enginn lagfra fyrir okkur.

Ekki er heldur nein skemmri skrn mguleg - .e. upptaka annars gjaldmiils leysir engin efnahagsleg vandaml vert mti gerir au erfiari rlausnar.

Auvita sar meir, egar vi hfum byggt upp samkeppnishfara tflutningshagkerfi sem flytur t vermtann varning sta hrvru eins og n er reyndin - egar vi hfum strbtt innlenda hagstjrn annig a hana veri hgt a leggja raunveruleg traust; fyrst verur a mnu mati hgt a huga a fyrir alvru hvort sniugt s a taka upp annan gjaldmiil.

a arf a skapa forsendur ess a slkt geti gengi upp - eins og hlutir eru dag, vri a fjarskalega lklegt a upptaka annars gjaldmiils myndi vera farsl lausn fyrir sl. efnahagsml - fyrir lfskjr vorrar jar og hamingju.

Kv.


Bandarkin virast eiga strfelldum efnahagsvanda!

a virist sem a vandi bandar. efnahagslfs hafi veri vanmetinn af stjrnvldum ar landi. En n rtt fyrir grarlegan fjraustur er n svo komi, a hagvxtur ar landi er a hrynja saman n. sta ess sem sp var, a hann yri mili 3-4% stefnir hann veri eingunis milli 1-2%. ofanlag, hefur eftirspurn eftir bum hruni saman n, og ef s eftirspurn n lgri en egar kreppan var verst 2008.

Eins og n er tlit fyrir stefnir mjg llegann hagvxt fremur en samdrtt, jafnvel svo a annig veri etta fram nstu misseri.

sta essa er s, a vlin bandar. hagkerfinu sem er eftirspurn almennings er lamasessi - .e. vegna skuldastu neytenda.

eir fara ekki a eya n fyrr en eir hafa grynnka skuldum, og a mun taka sennilege e-h r. mean, verur hagvxtur ltill ea nr enginn.

hugaver grein Financial Times - : US consumer spending

  • bending Lex hj FT er a skr merki su um samdrtt neyslu Bandarkjunum.

"Thanks to internet commerce, it is possible to observe shopping trends minute by minute. The Consumer Metrics Institute,,,CMI produces a daily index, weighted by sector, which shows whether spending was higher or lower than the same weekday a year ago."

"During the 2008 recession, the discretionary spending index fell sharply then rebounded for a total contraction period of 223 days. This year the index has been below 100 for just as long, but there is no sign yet of a rebound. On the contrary, the rate of fall is approaching the minus 6 per cent low set two years ago. Consumers at least the affluent ones who are more likely to shop online are reining in their spending."

"The CMI,,,was an accurate indicator of the last downturn, and the negative readings make sense when the American sheep are harrassed by the wolves of unemployment and a broken housing market. A double dip looks all too likely."

Mr finnst etta mjg hugaver vsbending, en Bandar. eru komin mjg langt Internet verslun og a virkar raunhft a undirliggjandi sveiflur byrtist me skjtum htti einmitt v svii verlsunar.

Alex Jurshevski hefur skrifa nja bloggfrslu - :

Hubris Meets Nemesis

"Government Tax revenues are slowing. According the Heritage Foundation the problem has some scale: US federal tax receipts are tracking at around 14.8% of GDP, compared to 20.6% in 2000 and a 30 year average of slightly over 18% of GDP. The US Government is being squeezed between too slow a rebound in tax revenues and the limitations on how quickly it can realistically take its funding requirements to the US Treasury auctions. This cash management information is signalling trouble ahead simply because the economy is recovering much more slowly that what was assumed in Administration fiscal forecasts."

.s. etta ir er a innkoma bandar. alrkisins verur mynni en reikna var me, .s. hagvxtur er ekki a standast vntingar. En minni hagvxtur ir minni skatttekjur.

a san hefur san nnur neikv hrif .s. hallinn alrkissji eykst enn meir, annig a skuldir alrkisins hkka enn hraar, sem magnar upp skammtma fjrmgnunar vanda alrkisins, m.a.

"Investment in State and local issuance has completely dried up. As a consequence States and cities across America are amassing scary, yet non-market fundable, budget shortfalls in record time." - "Moreover, according to the Economic Policy Journal, 32 states are now technically bankrupt, and are borrowing money from the Federal Treasury (read printed money) just to keep up with unemployment benefits."

.s. etta ir er a a s enginn markaur lengur fyrir hendi, fyrir skuldabrf gefin t af fjlmrgum sveitarflgum og meira a segja rkjum.

Me rum orum, au sveitarflg og rki geta ekki tvega sr lnsf markai.

ess sta vera au a f neyarln fr alrkinu.

etta er augljslega mjg alvarlegt stand.

Readers of this blog know that we have estimated the number of insolvent and/or severely impaired banks in the US to be well over 2000 institutions, far higher than the 800 or so that were supposedly on the FDIC watchlist earlier this year....April 2nd, 2010 marked the first anniversary of the date when FASB 157 was suspended...How much closer are these banks to regaining financial health? The answer is: No one knows for sure, because the problems have been swept out of view as a consequence of the removal of the `mark-to-market` rules.

Recovery Partners metur fj. gjaldrota banka Bandar. mun hrri en bandar. stjv. gera. g hef engar forsendur til a tj mig um a. En .e. sannarlega rtt snist mr, a a s hyggjuefni a enn hafi ekki FASB 157 veri endurreistur, en ar var kv um a bankar byrtu tilteknar upplsingar samanburarhfu formati, annig a hver sem er gat s eirra raunstu. a hann hafi ekki enn veri endurreistur er sjlfsagt rtt a s hyggjuefni v slkt leiir elilega aila til a gruna hi versta.

Hver veit, kannski er a versta einfaldega rtt.

The full force of the plunge in US housing activity after the expiry of the homebuyer tax credit was revealed today in the form of a massive 27.2% decline in existing home sales in July. Sales are now 34% below Aprils tax credit-induced peak, well below the previous cycle low back in November 2008 and at a level not seen since June 1993...Mortgage applications for home purchase remain close to their recent 14-year low. All of this is happening despite record low mortgage rates. Most observers now concede that weak housing activity is constraining the already fragile and tenuous growth prospects for the general economy.

etta fall verur a lkja vi hrun. En minnkun eftirspurnar um 1/4 er grarlega mikil breyting.

essar upplsingar koma einnig fram FT - US home sales plunge to 15-year low

.s. virist me rum orum gerast, a egar bandar. stjv. enda prgramm sem veitti skattafsltt fyrir sem fjrfestu nrri hseign ea b, hrynur salan alveg um lei og .s. verra er niur fyrir .s. salan var minnst ri 2008.

etta verur a segjast, a s mjg sterk vsbending um a svokallair "stimulus"-pakkar alrkisins, .s. alrki hefur eytt gnarfjrhum til a hvetja hagkerfi, s nnast a eina er haldi uppi einhverjum hagvexti.

Me rum orum, s etta sndarhagvxtur.


  • "Usually, a Sovereign debt management strategy features limits on issuance of short term debt in order that the debt portfolio not become too sensitive to rate resets and liquidity conditions in the funding markets."
  • "Thus, a typical issuance strategy for Sovereigns would be to seek 80% fixed rate term debt,"
  • "perhaps 20% in floating maturities and perhaps a small portion in inflation indexed stock."
  • "In addition, debt managers try to aim for an average maturity of the overall portfolio that will shield it from interest rate volatility usually by aiming for a duration range of 4-6 years. Stable borrowing strategies also feature a diversification of funding sources."
  1. "...in the recent US Government fiscal year over 70% of issuance has been in the one year and under (i.e. short dated and floating) portion of the maturity spectrum."
  2. "Issuance in the 10 year and over maturities has so far constituted less than 7% of the funding requirements."
  3. "As the deficits projected for the next few years are very large, this disproportionate short-dated issuance will vastly increase the vulnerability of the US Government Budget to rising rates and market funding conditions, placing pressure on the Fed to maintain low rates and possibly imperiling the Dollar as reserve currency should it come under speculative attack."
  4. "The focus on short-dated issuance in a situation where gargantuan deficits are in store is a very significant risk factor."
  5. "Ironically, a key risk factor affecting the US dollaris precisely the debt managment connundrum described above."

Eins og hann bendir , en Jurshevski er srfringur stringu strra skuldakerfa, reyna gjarnan strendur strra skuldadma hafa lnin ekki mjg stutt - sbr. gjalddaga eftir 4-6 r.

A auki reyna eir a hafa megni af eim lnum me fasta vexti.

Yfirleitt ekki meira en 20% breytilegum vxtum.

etta s gert til a lgmarka httu og kostna af skuldunum fyrir skuldarann.

  • Eins og fram kemur bloggfrslunni, hafa knv. stjv. a mestu htt strfelldum kaupum bandar. skuldabrfum - sem eru strtindi. Hi minnsta bili.
  • Mig grunar a um valdi einfaldlega a knv. stjv. hafi veri a nota fjrmagni heima fyrir - en knv. stjv. eins og bandar. hafa veri a dla peningum inn eigi hagkerfi. Knv. n ess a taka ln.
  • sama tma, hafi bresk stjv. einnig htt kaupum o.flr. evr. rki er voru strir kaupendur. En, etta skrist sennilega einnig af afleiingum kreppunnar.
  • En etta framkalli ann vanda a bandar. stjv. veri algerlega a treysta einkamarkainn fyrir skuldabrf, .e. slur markai.
  • v miur hafi eftirspurn fyrst og fremst veri eftir skammtmabrfum - .e. 1 r senn.
  • etta hmarki httu bandar. stjv. sama tma a grarlegur halli geri eim mgulegt anna en a skja sr grarlegt fjrmagn me essum htti.
  • a stefni v a magn skammtmabrfa haldi fram eftir a straukast innan heildarskuldapakka bandar. alrkisstj. og magnast stug og hratt a fjrhagslega fall er alrkissjur Bandar. myndi vera fyrir, ef vaxtakrafa sjlfra Bandar. myndi aukast allt einu.
  • Jurshevski er a vara vi essu sem "potential default risk" hvorki meira n minna.

Niurstaa

Jurshevski bendir bloggfrslu sinni, a runin egar fjrfestar fari a kyrrast s ekki lnuleg - vert mti virki hn me eim htti, a a su rskuldar og egar fari er yfir einn geti tt sr sta str sveifla mati markaarins - mjg skyndilega.

etta sum vi snemma rinu er lnshfi Grikkland hrundi nokkrum vikum, og a var greislurota reynd.

  • Punktur Jurshevskis er a .s. skuldir Bandar. aukist hratt vegna eyslustefnu nverandi stjv.
  • sama tma og forsendur til hagvaxtar virast frmunalega llegar nstunni.
  • Og til a bta gru ofan svart, s bandar. alrki tilneytt til a taka mjg miki af skammtmalnum, til a fjrmagna sinn gnarstra halla.

s stugt veri a grafa undan trausti fjrfesta langtma greislugetu sjlfs bandar. alrkisins.

a s einfaldlega ekki lengur absrd a sjlf Bandarkin geti allt einu fundi sig handan rskulds, .s. allt einu tr markaarins greislugetu bandar. alrkisins bur skyndilega verulegann hnekki.

Ef og egar etta gerirst, verur ekki betur s a myndi hefjast aljleg fjrmlakrsa er vri algerlega fordmalaus.

Kv.


Skrtin deila - er algunarferli egar gangi?

Smskrtin deila er komin upp milli Jns Bjarnasonar - annars vegar - og - hins vegar - Steingrms J. Sigfssonar, Jhnnu Sigurardttur og ssurar Skarphinssonar.

.s Jn Bjarnason heldur fram er a algunarferli a ESB .e. breytingar innlendum stofnunum, til a svara krfum ESB um algun, s egar hafi.

essu mtmla hinir og segja Jn Bjarnason misskilja hva s gangi. Eingngu s um undirbning a ra, .e. a undirba r skipulagsbreytingar sem urfi a framkvma, svo hgt s a hrinda eim framkvmd me skjtum htti - egar aild tekur gildi.

Ekki veit g hva er satt essu - ekki sst snst etta um muninn algunarferli og undirbningsferli - en .e. ekkert lgum ESB ea fyrir a slenskum lgum, sem bannar a a sland ea land sem skar algunar, taki upp hj sjlfu sr a framkvma algunarbreytingar egar um er a ra innleiingu laga - reglugera - ea innlendar stofnanabreytingar.

.s. Samfar vilja ESB er eim a sjlfsgu mjg tranlegt til a vera ekki eingngu a undibyggja breytingar sem a hrinda framkvmd einhverntma seinna, heldur breytingar er a innleia um lei og skipulagsvinnan tengd eim hefur veri klru.

  • En, .e. ein af forsendum aildar a lg vikomandi lands su algu a eim lagaramma er gildir innan ESB.
  • g vri alls ekki hissa , a Samfar su a planleggja a taka sm forskot sluna annig s.
  • Eins og g sagi - a brtur engin lg hvorki innlend n lg ESB a innleia slkar breytingar einhlia ur en aild kemst til framkvmda, ea - ur en samningar um aild hafa fari fram.

Jn Bjarnason getur vntanlega komi veg fyrir slkar algunar tengar breytingar innan sns runeytis og stofnana undir umsj hans runeytis, og vntanlega arir rherrar VG. En, .e. ekkert sem VG getur gert til a koma veg fyrir a rherrar Samf framkvmi r innan sinna runeyta og eirra stofnana er eirra runeyti hafa umsjn yfir.

Mr snist upphlaupi vera hluti af eirri vaxandi spennu sem greinilega er milli ESB andstinga innan stjrnarheimilisins og eirra hinna.

Kv.


Vandi krnunnar hefur me sl. hagstjrn a gera - s vandi hverfur ekkert skipt s um gjaldmiil!

rlandi, Spni og Grikklandi - tkst llum rem alveg eins og okkur, a framkalla hj sjlfum sr bluhagkerfi. Og, g vil halda v fram a Evran hafi spila ar rullu.

Margir bsna hrlendis hversu grarleg framfr a vri, a f almennt s lgra vaxtastig en gengur og gerist a llu jafnai okkar krnu hagkerfi.

En, .s. eir smu ailar lta framhj er a vextir eru ttur hefbundinni jafnvgis hagstjrn:

Hefbundin jafnvgis hagstj. er a hvetja til hagvaxtar egar .e. kreppa og san a letja til hans egar allt leikur sum vegna enslu gri. Vextir eru einfaldlega einn ttur essarar hagstj.

  • Ef .e. kreppa viltu hafa lga vexti svo ln su dr - v a akkrat virkar hvetjandi hagkerfi.
  • hinn bginn, egar .e. sterkur hagvxtur til staar og enginn slaki, viltu hafa ha vexti til a sl eftirspurnarrsting sem annars fir upp verblgu - og versta falli, getur leitt til bluhagkerfis.
.e. sem sagt alls ekki annig, a lgir vextir su gi vi allar astur.

etta snir reyndar hve rur Evrusinna er fjlda tilvika forheimskur.

a augljslega minnkar skilvirkni hagstjrnar a hafa ekki lengur umr yfir vaxtatkinu.
  • g held a a s engin tilviljun a 3 lnd Evrusvisins lentu ll me tlu eins og sland hagkerfi verblu - .e. rland, Spnn og Grikkland.
  • g tel a auki a Evran sjlf hafi spila rullu eirri tkomu.
  • Me smu hrifum og slandi, er gengi krnunnar belgdist t i blunni, hkkai gengi Evru allan sasta ratug og - hgengi gjaldmiils eykur kaupmtt launa, sem eykur eftirspurn, sem eykur verblgu o.s.frv.
  • Ef san ar ofan allt saman, eins og er algengt hrlendis, a ailar vinnumarkaarins eru a hkka laun reglulega - er a enn ein vtamnsprautan eld eftirspurnar.

Innan Evru ertu me frri stjrntki fyrir hagkerfi og .e. sjlfstur vandi!

Ef ert me eigin gjaldmiil, getur dreift laginu af v a halda stjrn hagkerfinu fleiri stjrntki:

  • Vextir, eins og g sagi, eir eru almennt s einmitt gott stjrntki til a halda aftur af eftirspurn, .e. hkkar ef arft a bremsa af eftirspurn.
  • Skattar, geta gengt svipuu hlutverki, .e. eir einnig draga peninga t r hagkerfinu og annig hgja v.
  • Eysla ea sparnaur rkis og sveitarflaga, er eitt stjrntki enn.
  • San er a nttrulega gengi.

a versnar san v, ef stjrntkin er rur ekki yfir eru a kynda undir hagkerfinu, sama tma og arft a hgja v.

Vi fengum sm forsmekk af slku t sustu rkisstj. DO og H, er Selabankinn reyndi a sl enslu me hkkun vaxta, sama tima og rkisstj. kynti undir eins og hn gat. Eins og vi vitum, endai etta allt saman me bluhagkerfi og san stru krassi.

er aeins eftir a skera niur og hkka skatta, ef tlar a bresma hagkerfi af, ur en efni er komi.

  • Me rum orum, einungis rri vegum stjrnvalda sjlfra eru eftir.
  • sama tma vita allir a sl. stjrnssla er lleg - sl. plitkusar llegir hagstrendur - en samt vilja menn innleia fyrirkomulag, .s. aeins eir stra hagkerfinu.

Punktur a auki sem vert er a huga, er a ef einungis stritki stjrnvalda eru eftir, og vextir og gengisstaa kynda sama tma undir; arf mjg rttka gagnager formi niurskurar / skattahkkana, ea hvorttveggja, til a hn hafi nokkurn mguleika til a virka.

Auvita enn - enn - enn rttkari, ef au tki er arir stra eru a virka hina ttina.

  • Me rum orum, a missa stritki vaxta og gengis, dregur mjg umtalsvert r lkum ess a r takist a halda stjrn hagkerfinu, takist a hindra a a losni r bndum.
  • Eins og g sagi, g held a a s engin tilviljun a 3 aildarlnd Evru lentu eftirspurnar bluhagkerfi.

Niurstaa

a kaldhnislega er a n eigin gjaldmiils verur hagstjrn mun erfiari en ur, en samt viurkenna allir a sl. hagstj. fram a essu hefur veri fremur lleg.

ir a ekki einfaldlega a, sland mun endurtaka hagkerfisklir Grikkland, rlands og Spnar?

- og a ekki endilega bara einu sinni?

Kv.


ssur Skarphinsson - "Vill stuning ESB vi krnuna"!

etta hefur oft ur komi fram. En, draumur eirra sem vilja sland inn sem allra fyrst, er a f fram samning vi Selabanka Evrpu, um a s tryggji tilteki gengi krnunnar. San veri gjaldeyrishft afnumin hrlendis.

Vill stuning ESB vi krnuna " reyndu menn a komast a niurstu um me hvaa htti Evrpusambandi og Selabanki Evrpu geti komi a v a dpka slenskan gjaldeyrismarka. a yri strax partur a v a styrkja stuna hr heima og undirba upptku evrunnar," segir utanrkisrherra."

  • Eins og etta hefur hljma mli sumra er g hef heyrt, virist menn dreyma um a Selabanki Evrpu borgi fyrir aflttingu gjaldeyrishafta.
  • Eins og standi er dag, a ef gjaldeyrishfum er afltt, streyma svokllu krnubrf t, til ess a a s mgulegt a hleypa eim t, arf a vera til staar ngilegt f formi erlends gjaldeyris gjaldeyrisvarasji svo a hgt s a skipta essum brfum r krnum einhvern annan gjaldmiil. Ef a f reynist ngt .e. gjaldeyrisforinn klrast ur en ll brfin hafa streymt t verur landi um hl greislurota. Eins og mlum er htta dag er a akkrat svo, a ekki er til staar ngilega str fori.
  • Svo fremi sem forinn er ngur, og losa er um hft, fjlgar krnum umfer hrlendis um lei og krnubrfin streyma t, og ver krnunnar lkkar - eins og vi m bast egar frambo streykst n samsvarandi aukningar eftirspurnar. a verfall krnunnar, framkallar frekari hkkun allra vertryggra lna auk ess a allur innfluttur varningur mun hkka veri.
  • N, .s. gerist ef til staar vri gjaldeyrisskipta samningur vi Selabanka Evrpu, a dlir hann hinga Evrum annig a tryggt er a ngur gjaldeyrir veri til staar. A auki, a ef auk essa hann hefur samykkt a tryggja hr tilteki gengi krnu, kaupir hann krnur til a vihalda ngilegri eftirspurn eftir henni til a tryggja vimiunar vergildi.
  • Tali um a dpka sl. gjaldeyrismarka getur vart fali anna sr, en a samninganefndin s a reyna a f fram gjaldeyrisskipta samning eins og g lsti a ofan.
  • Hitt, a Selabanki Evrpu tryggji tilteki gengi krnunnar, rtt er a rifja upp a um lei og aildarsamningur hefur teki gildi, .e. veri samykktur og stafestur hr, og a auki, einnig samykktur og stafestur af 27 aildarrkjum ESB - ferli er getur teki nokkurn tma, er hgt a f aild a ERM II sem er gjaldmiilssamstarf Evrpu nokkurs konar fordyri a Evrunni. Innan ramma ess, fylgir a Selabanki Evrpu tryggji gengi aildargjaldmiils innan +/- 15% vikmarka.
  • Tvisvar 15 eins og vntanlega flestir tku eftir er 30, annig a innan ramma ERM II getur aildargjaldmiill sveiflast allt a 30% n ess a Selabanki Evrpu skipti sr hi minnsta a mlum.
  • En, eins og margtreka tal hugamanna um aild hefur hljmar, virist sem a flk dreymi um meira en etta - .e. krnunni veri haldi innan rengri vikmarka af Selabanka Evrpu. En, a held g a s fullkomlega borin von. En, Selabanki Evrpu er ekki ggerarstofnun. En, fyrrgreind krafa myndi fela sr a Selabanki Evrpu myndi borga a miklu leiti fyrir hagkerfislega algun sland - reynd hreinn efnahags-stuningur.
  • Eins og ERM II er sett upp, er a algerlega hendi nrra aildarrkja a framkvma hjlparlaust a mestu hagkerfisalgun sem krafist er, svo ntt aildarland fi a taka upp Evru.
  • Varandi .s. til arf til a ganga Evru er a eftirfarandi (Convergence criteria):
  1. Skuldir rkissjs ekki umfram 60%.
  2. Halli rkissjs ekki umfram 3%.
  3. Vaxtastig m ekki vera nema 2% hrra en vaxtastig hj eim aildarlndum .s. vaxtastig er lgst.
  4. Gengi krnunnar m ekki lkka neitt - meina g alls ekki neitt, samfellt 2 r.
  • Verblga dag er cirka 4,8% og Selabanki reiknar me a hn fari niur 2,2% um mitt nsta r.
  • Skuldir rkissjs sl. eru meira en tvfalt hrri en leyfilegt lgmark.
  • Halli rkissj. sl. er e-h vi a a vera refalt leyfilegt lgmark.
  • Varandi vandann a halda genginu stugu yfir 2. ra tmabil, hefur a stundum tekist - en, til ess a svo veri arf hagkerfi a vera stugt en sveiflur gengi krnunnar eiga sr sgulega sta ef hagkerfi sjlft sveiflast.
  • Munum a dag gerir Selabankinn r fyrir cirka 2,2% hagvexti nsta ri en ekki nema 1,7% ri eftir. r tlur innibera a a tlu strverkefni fari af sta. Ef au gera a ekki, verur hagkerfisframvinda hjkvmilega lakari. Tja, g er a tala um hagvxt var yfir prsenti sennilega milli 0 og eins prsents, .e. ef a verur raunverulega hagvxtur.
  • sta ess a g set etta fram, er a ef essi verkefni skila sr ekki, er ekki hgt a sj hvernig sland skpunum a fara af v, a n endum saman. En, greislutlun rkisstj. og AGS reiknar me eirri tekjuaukningu sem a eiga sr sta me tilkomu strframkvmda formi risalvera og risaorkuframkvmda. Svo, a ef ekki af eim verur, verur maur a lykta a endar nist ekki saman.
  • Ef a gerist ekki, a sjlfsgu erum vi ekki leiinni einhverri ninni framt, a lkka skuldir niur 60%. Fremur, a landi stefni greislurot innan nokkurra ra - sasta lagi. a auvita mun fresta einhverri Evruaild um tiltekinn tma.

Kv.

Bandarkin hafa hafi tak til a efla samskipti sn vi og hrif sn rki SA-Asu!

hugaverir hlutir virast gangi tengslum vi samskipti Bandarkjanna og SA-Asu. En agst virist sem a tak Bandar. til a efla n hrif sn, og dpka samskipti sn vi rki SA-Asu, hafi veri hleypt af stokkunum.

  • .s. stingur mest stf, er a Bandar. hafa kvei a taka n upp stjrnmlasamband vi Myanmar. Indverjar hafa vst einnig nveri opna eigin sendir ar.
  • Nsta atrii, er a Bandarkin hafa kvei a styja kjarnorkuvingu Vetnam, sem vst a vera til frisamlegrar raforkuframleislu eingngu.
  • En, einhvern veginn grunar mig, a ef seinna kemur ljs, a Vetnam er allt einu ori kjarnorkuveldi, veri Bandar. vi minna pirru v, en nverandi plnum rana.
  • eir tla einnig a rsa tak til astoar rkjum vi Mekongfljt .e. Tailand og Laos, vi a a n meiri ntingu r v mikla vatnsfalli. Samskipti eiga einnig a vera nnari vi Kambtseu.
  • Sem sagt, fyrri herslum um a eingangra rki er fremja mannrttindabrot er kasta fyrir ra.

Einhvern veginn, er g ekki mjg - mjg hissa. En, Kna hefur me engum htti lti slk atrii stva sn pln, ea jafnvel hgja eim.

Nna virist sem a bi Bandar. og Indland, hafi komist bi tv a eirri niurstu, a au rki hafi ekkert anna val en a mta vaxandi veldi Kna hvar sem eir eru a efla sn hrif innan SA-Asu.

U.S., China: Conflicting Interests in Southeast Asia

Af hverju er SA-Asa svo mikilvg?

etta snst um siglingaleiir. En, rki SA-Asu mynda rengingar sem hgt er me hgarleik beita til a skapa mjg str vandri vi siglingar. etta sst ef kosti er skoaa, a lndin v svi mynda hindranir milli sem eru mj sund, sem vinsamir ailar geta hagntt sr.

.s. grundvllur veldis Bandar. er drottnun heimshfunum til a tryggja ruggar siglinga kaupskipa ar yfir, hafa eir hyggjur af eim raunverulega mguleika a Kna takist a gera mrg essara rkja a nokkurs konar lepprkjum snum.

Myanmar er egar langleiina anga komi, en ar hafa Knverjar n byggt stra flotast og eru mijum klum a byggja upp miki vegakerfi fr eim hfnum, til innhraa Kna. En, ef i horfi korti sji i a .e. raunverulega styttri vegalengd fr hfnum Myanmar til tiltekinna hraa SV-Kna en fr hfnum eigin strnd Kna.

A auki eru r hafnir einnig mun styttra fr oluhfnunum vi Persafla, svo a vri einnig mjg hentugt fyrir Kna a skipa ar upp olu og svo flytja hana me ppum restina af leiinni.

Eitt enn hugavert sem gangi er, eru pln Knv. me leyfi Tailenskra stjv. a grafa skipaskur gegnum Malakkaskaga .s. hann er mjstur ur en kemur a landamrum vi Malasu, en a einnig auveldar siglingar til Kna fr Persafla. A auki, urfa au skip ekki lengur a sigla framj Malasu, .s. hrif Knv. eru minni og mguleiki til a veri vinsamlegt Kna.

Eina landi sem raunverulega sns a standa hrinu Kna er Vetnam svo .e. ef til vill ekki undarlegt a Bandar. velji a leggja hfuherslu a efla a land.

Samt sem ur tla eir a einbeita sr a llum rkjunum.

a verur a koma ljs hve mikill rangur verur af essu taki.

En, Bandar. eru dag a spa nokkurt seyi af ofurfkus Bush stjrnarinnar Persafla og rak, svokalla str gegn hryjuverkum. Fyrir bragi var ltil hersla a bregast vi vaxandi hrifum Kna, ea nnar tilteki, ltil orka aflgu til eirra hluta.

a verur a koma ljs hve mikla orku aflgu Bandar. raunverulega hafa, .s. enn eru eir stri Afganistan og enn me herafla rak, allar svokallaar bardagasveitir su farnar, er ar enn fjlmennur mannskapur af ru tagi.

a m vera a eir neyist til a fkusa a land .s. einna helst er sns a hgt s a byggja upp annig a a geti staist vaxandi hrif Kna. En a er Vetnam og san lnd lengra suri eins og Malasa og Indnesa.

g er fremur skeptskur a Bandar. geti n miklu fram Myanmar, sem egar virist nnast ori alveg a knv. hjlendu. hrif Knv. Thailand virast einnig hafa vaxi mjg miki, og getur einnig reynst erfitt ar a vinda nokku ofan.

Samt, g hugsa a Bandar. hafi enn mguleika hi minnsta til a hgja vexti hrifa Kna SA-Asu.

sama tma, er Indland einnig a hefja eigi tak, t.d. Myanmar. En, eir hafa hyggjur af v rki, enda Myanmar me landamri a Indlandi. Knv. einnig hafa flotast Pakistan, og Indverjar hafa elilega hyggjur af v a Kna s a umkringja me snu veldi - snum vaxandi hrifum.

a m v reikna me a nstu rum muni spennan essu svi og Indlandshafi fara hratt vaxandi. En, Indverjar eru a byggja upp eigin flotastva eyjum Indlandshafs, hugsaar sem nokkurs konar varnargiring ef kemur til hugsanlegt strs vi Kna.

Bandarkin eru svona mitt milli - og lklegt a Indland og Bandar. sji sr hag af samstarfi.

Kv.

------------------------Sj a nean analsu STRATFOR

U.S., China: Conflicting Interests in Southeast Asia

August 12, 2010 | 1216 GMT
Summary

The United States and China are increasingly at odds over the formers aggressive new re-engagement policy in Southeast Asia. Though Washington will not necessarily maintain its current accelerated pace of engagement, Beijings resistance to U.S. advances in the region will be a source of increased tension between the two countries.

Analysis

The United States and Vietnam launched a round of joint activities Aug. 8 as part of a commemoration of the 15th anniversary of normalized U.S.-Vietnamese ties in 1995. The United States sent nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington to Da Nang, Vietnam, on Aug. 8 to host talks with Vietnamese officials, and the guided missile destroyer USS John S. McCain arrived Aug. 10 to lead the first-ever joint naval exercises over four days, covering search and rescue, damage control, maintenance, emergency repair and firefighting operations. At the same time, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry confirmed that Hanoi has entered bilateral negotiations with the United States over a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, which has been rumored to involve the United States giving its blessing for Vietnam to enrich uranium on its own soil.

The meeting comes amid heightened tensions over the U.S. presence in Chinas near abroad. In recent months, the United States has sped up its re-engagement with Southeast Asia, stirring anxieties in China about U.S. intentions. While the United States will not necessarily maintain its current rapid pace, it appears committed to sustaining this policy in the coming years, contrary to previous bids to rejuvenate its interaction with the region after the post-Cold War hiatus. The American goal is to reassert leadership gradually in the region in economic, political and security affairs. By doing so, the United States would update its strategic posture, increase competition with Chinaand give Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states more confidence and freedom to maneuver on pursuing their interests in the presence of greater powers.

Forms of Re-engagement

The high-profile U.S.-Vietnamese visit and exercises are taking place after a series of recent U.S. moves to increase its stature in the region. In July, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the ASEAN foreign ministers summit and emphasized that the United States is genuine about implementing its Southeast Asia re-engagement policy, starting with closer ties to ASEAN.

Clinton pointed to a critical dimension of the policy when she declared that freedom of navigation in maritime Southeast Asia is in the national interest of the United States and all states with an interest in stable seaborne trade. She also called for an international resolution mechanism for handling territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. Clintons comments drew sharp rebuttals from Chinese officials and state press, highlighting Chinas policy that the South China Sea is a sovereign area of core interest like Taiwan or Tibet and that territorial disagreements should be handled through bilateral negotiations. Subsequently, Chinas Peoples Liberation Army Navy launched large-scale military exercises in the sea. Clintons comments also provoked debate across the region, with the Philippine foreign secretary stating publicly that the United States has no reason to get involved in regional boundary disputes, which rightfully belong to China and ASEAN alone. The statement should not be taken to mean that the Philippines, a U.S. ally, will not play a supportive role in the policy, but it does indicate the ambivalence that Southeast Asian states feel toward the prospect of becoming contested terrain between the United States and China.

The United States has a Pacific coast and an extensive and longstanding interaction with the Asia-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia. Fundamentally, U.S. global power rests on its control of the oceans, which enables it to protect its own shores and intervene selectively abroad to prevent the rise of regional powers. Maritime Southeast Asia is essentially a bottleneck marked by the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea and other minor routes through which all commercial and military vessels must pass if they are to transit between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The United States thus seeks to ensure that there is freedom of navigation on international waters, that shipping routes remain open and stable and that no foreign power could seek to deny access to the U.S. Navy. This drives the United States to pursue security ties with regional players, to stem militancy and piracy and to preserve the broader balance of power.

Moreover, Washington has an interest in cultivating strong economic ties with Southeast Asia, which has a population of 500 million, produces natural resources and offers low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing and is hungry for investment to fuel its rapid development. The financial crisis has inspired the United States to expand these ties both to increase its exports and to tap into new sources of growth. Essentially, the regions economic power is large and growing, and the United States already has a history of trade and security ties with several states. After having played an extremely limited role in the region following the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States is seeking to revive those ties and form new relations with non-allies to reflect changing realities namely Chinas economic and military ascent and increasing assertiveness in the region, especially in the South China Sea.

American engagement with the region is focusing specifically on reinforcing its freedom to operate in international waters and updating relations with official allies like the Philippines and Thailand, strengthening bonds with partners like Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, and forging new ties with states formerly shunned, like Cambodia, Laos and, to a lesser extent, Myanmar. By re-establishing diplomatic relations with Myanmar in 2009, the United States paved the way to improve its interaction with ASEAN as an organization. U.S. President Barack Obama met with the ASEAN heads of state and Secretary Clinton signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009. The United States also established the Lower Mekong Initiative to help Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand with a range of environmental, social and infrastructural issues and pledged to send a permanent ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.

Meanwhile, the United States has stepped up bilateral relations with the ten ASEAN members, including, among other things, pursuing the aforementioned naval and nuclear deals with Vietnam, restoring full military relations with Indonesia to pave the way for enhanced training and assistance, opening up the annual major Cobra Gold military exercises to Malaysia, holding military and security training with Cambodia and opening diplomatic visits with Myanmarand Laos. The United States has also sought to participate in the East Asia Summit, a security grouping that it previously showed little interest in, and has begun negotiations to create a new regional trade bloc called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that will include among its ranks Singapore, Vietnam and Brunei.

Chinas View

From the U.S. point of view, this policy not only does not require Chinas approval but also is not inherently aggressive toward China. Asserting the need for stability and right of safe passage on international waters can be expected from the naval superpower. Moreover, it falls in line with the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and although China understandably criticizes the United States for not yet ratifying the treaty (which the U.S. Senate does not appear likely to do soon, though it has broad support and was nearly put to vote as recently as 2009), Washington nevertheless argues that it adheres to the principles of the UNCLOS anyway since they are based on older international maritime norms.

On the issue of a multilateral mechanism for resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the United States argues that such disputes pose a risk to international maritime security and that U.S. support for such an initiative merely means supporting a binding agreement based on principles of the ASEAN-China 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea while maintaining its customary neutrality in specific disputes. Similarly, with the Lower Mekong Initiative, the United States claims it intends merely to assist with water resources management and similar issues among states bordering the Mekong. However, China patently rejects what it sees as the internationalization of the South China Seas territorial disputes, as well as the idea of the United States insinuating itself into bilateral arguments about Chinas hydropower projects and their effect on the Mekongs water levels as a means of setting the smaller countries against Beijing.

The problem for China is that the reassertion of American interests runs directly counter to its national interests and policy for the region, but will prove tough to resist. China has been enjoying stability on its borders with Southeast Asia and rapidly expanding economic ties with these states over the past two decades (and notably after the ASEAN-China free trade agreement took full effect in January). Following a tumultuous 20th century, Chinas strength is growing on the back of a surging, albeit imbalanced, economy, and its leaders feel it has only recently met crucial strategic objectives. Namely, it has achieved regime stability and unity in the Han core and has secured its important buffer zones, though it knows this achievement is resting on a shifting foundation and is dangerously at risk from a range of internal and external forces. Still, to maintain and extend these strategic successes, Beijing needs to focus on certain external objectives.

Chief among these objectives are resource security and national defense as they relate to Southeast Asia. As Chinas economic dependence on the international system has grown, it has become more reliant on overseas trade, in particular for Chinese exports to consumers and imports of raw materials. Many essential inputs, especially oil from the Middle East and Africa, require transit through Southeast Asia. Long maritime supply lines are inherently vulnerable to disruptions of various kinds, from piracy to terrorism. But there is the added fear that as China becomes stronger, the United States will become more aggressive, and the U.S. Navy or even other rival navies like that of Japan or possibly India could someday take hostile action against Chinas supply lines. Because Chinas social and political stability currently rests on maintaining economic growth, Beijing must think of ways to secure supplies and minimize risks. It has sought to do so in part through continuing to develop domestic natural resources, reducing imbalances and inefficiencies in domestic consumption and pursuing land supply routes through Central Asia and Russia and a hybrid sea-land energy route through Myanmar

.

Nevertheless, seaborne supplies remain critical, and the chief focus thus becomes the South China Sea. In addition to modernizing its navy, China has concentrated more of its naval resources and strategy on the Southern Fleet based on Hainan Island, the launching platform for projecting naval power farther abroad, from its neighboring seas to the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and East African coast.

Separate from supply line concerns, the South China Sea has inherent value because it holds discovered and potential natural resources, including fishing grounds, oil, natural gas and other mineral deposits, thus intensifying the sovereignty disputes over the Paracel and Spratly islands. In fact, China has already threatened to retaliate against foreign companies cooperating with Vietnam on offshore oil exploration in the sea.

Even aside from the economic and commercial importance of the sea, Beijing has security reasons for reasserting its sovereignty there. Beijing wants to be capable of denying foreign powers the ability to approach the Chinese mainland or assist Chinas enemies in the region in the event of conflict. Taiwan remains a longstanding target due to the sovereignty dispute, and Vietnam is a traditional adversary and has aggressively resisted Chinas South China Sea strategy, including through the pursuit of Russian submarines and fighter jets.

The U.S. thrust into Southeast Asia thus inherently poses a threat to Chinas naval strategy and core interest in the South China Sea. China sees greater U.S. involvement as a deliberate attempt to take advantage of its new international dependencies, thwart its expanding influence and form a containment ring around it that can be used to suppress it, or even someday cut off its critical supplies or attack. Moreover, it raises the specter of deepening American involvement in mainland Southeast Asia that could serve as a tool to pressure China on its southern borders, as England and France did in the 19th and early 20th centuries at the height of European colonial power.

Conflicting Interests

The conflict between U.S. and Chinese strategic interests is therefore apparent, but not necessarily urgent. The U.S. re-engagement policy is gaining some momentum, but the United States will not necessarily permanently maintain this accelerated pace. U.S. efforts to reignite interest in Southeast Asia have moved haltingly throughout the past decade. Constraints on the American side as it attempts to extricate itself from Iraq and Afghanistan and develop balances between powers in the Middle East and South Asia suggest limitations on the amount of energy the United States will be able to devote to the policy.

What is clear is that the United States, despite delays, obstacles and other foreign policy priorities, is serious about re-engagement and will remain committed to a gradual process in the coming years. This will create new points of stress and rising competition with China for influence in the region. While neither side is looking to ignite hostilities, previous incidents show that there is potential for mistakes and confrontation. These include the EP-3 incident in 2001, a Chinese submarine surfacing near the USS Kitty Hawk in 2007 and minor confrontations and collisions between Chinese ships and the USNS Impeccableand USS John McCain (the same ship that visited Vietnam in mid-August) in 2009.

Ultimately, however, the United States has the upper hand. It has greater trade and security ties in the region as well as allies like Japan and Europe that also have strong economic ties with ASEAN states. The ASEAN states also have an incentive to attract a distant superpower to give themselves leverage against a potentially threatening and overbearing regional power especially given the disadvantages of falling on the superpowers bad side. And Beijings ability to compete will continue to be limited by its fragile domestic economic and social stability, given that its political and economic elite are in the midst of deep debates about the future of the country as they vie for better positioning in the generational leadership transition taking place over the coming years. Nevertheless, the United States will be limited in its engagement by the need to maintain bilateral relations with China, by the ASEAN states need to maintain a balance in their relations with China and their divisions between themselves, and by Washingtons own decisions and constraints regarding foreign policy priorities.

Overall, the effect of U.S. engagement will be gradually to modernize its strategic footholds in the region, put China on edge about U.S. intentions and give ASEAN states more freedom to maneuver for themselves. This will allow them to hedge against China, but it also will give them the opportunity to play the two countries and Japan and other interested players against one another, all while they continue to compete amongst themselves. Beijing can be expected to criticize the American strategy vocally when it takes notable steps, such as naval training with Vietnam, as well as to attempt to accelerate and leverage its own involvement in the region to pursue its interests.

China is not without options. Through its massive economic demand for Southeast Asian goods, aid with little political requirements attached and ability to give out state-supported credit and provide infrastructure construction, it will be able to lure ASEAN states into tighter relations. Its growing economic and military heft will be useful in deterring these states from becoming tools of the United States. Still, since Beijing knows it sits at a disadvantage to Washington if the policy is pursued aggressively, it will be particularly vigilant in watching the pace and means by which the United States pushes forward, especially focusing on military and security cooperation and issues in the South China Sea. Chinas vulnerability will make it more reactive to perceived threats, and Southeast Asia will likely become the scene of new flash points in the ongoing saga of U.S.-Chinese tensions.

--------------------------Endir STRATFOR analsu.

Kv.


Af hverju grunnvextir ekki 1%? Er einhver raunveruleg sta a hafa 5,5%? Skoa einnig sp Selabanka um hagvxt!

Stra frttin er a Selabankinn lkkar strivexti um 1% 5,5%. Sem er a sjlfsgu betra en a hafa 6,5%.

Selabankinn nefnir a verblga hafi lkka hraar en starfsmenn hans hafi tt von , v raunvextir ornir eim mun hrri og a eirra mati bor fyrir bru fyrir svo strri lkkun.

Peningaml, 18. gst 2010

En, eins og g spuri - af hverju ekki 1% strivexti? Einhverjum gti dotti huga a nefna a verblga skv. mati Selabanka s enn 4,8% annig a raunstrivextir yru neikvir upp 3,8%.

  • Munum a vi erum a tala um strivexti Selabanka, .e. veri peningunum til viskiptabankanna. etta eru ekki bankavextir, en viskiptabankarnir munu a sjlfsgu ekki bja upp neikva vexti, svo a g er ekki a tala um a almennt vaxtastig veri neikvtt.
  • hinn bginn, ef bankarnir f peningana 1% vxtum, er mismunurinn v og 4,8% verblgu 3,8% - sem m lta sem ngan vaxtamun fyrir viskiptabankana, annig a eir urfi ekki meira.
  • Skv. skrslu AGS eru innln bankanna upp 1.480 ma.kr. - 91% VLF (vergri landsframleislu). Ef vi myndum okkur rki hafi agang a cirka helming innlna, arir hinum helming, s etta fjrmagn yfri ng til a fjrmagna hallarekstur rkisins til nokkurra ra.
  • .s. g er a hugsa, er a ef bankarnir myndu bja 1% raunvexti innlnum, og myndu stta sig vi 3% raunvexti lnum til rkisins; vri hgt a bja rkinu ln fyrir 7,8%. 6,8% ef eir myndu stta sig vi 2% raunvexti.
  • San .s. verblga lkkar hratt, Selabankinn telur hana fara 2,2% um mitt nsta r, er lklegt a bankarnir geti fari niur um 6% snemma nsta ri. a vru mjg semkeppnishf kjr mia vi .s. rkinu stendur til boa annars staar fr.
  • Rk arf sem allra fyrst a htta a neya lfeyrissjina gambla me lfeyrissparna landsmanna, en eir hafa veri a fjrmagna halla rkisinsA auki gti rki htt, a lta lfeyrissjina gambla me lfeyri landsmanna, me v eins og n er a vera a fjrmagna halla rkissjs.
  • sama tma, borgar rki bnkunum 3% ea 2% raunvexti, og annig veitir vibtar fjrmagni inn .
g veit, a mnnum er lla samt sem ur vi tilhugsunina um neikva strivexti:
  • En s tti er stulaus, .s. nverandi verblga er ekki me neinum htti knin af eftirspurn heldur eingngu eftirhreytur gengisfallsins fyrir tveim rum, og .e. ekkert - alls ekkert, sem er a knja hana fram, annig a hn getur ekki anna en haldi fram a hverfa smm saman.
  • A auki, virka vextir ekkert - og g meina, alls ekkert verblgu af essu tagi - nema aeins, og meina g aeins, a vaxtastigi s a hjlpa upp stugleika gjaldmiilsins, .e. minnka lkur gengisfalli.
  • Vextir einfaldlega geta ekki haft neina ara virkni verblgu er kemur til vegna genfisfalls. eir aftur mti hafa mjg fluga virkni gegn eftirspurnarverblgu.
  • annig, a .e. alveg htt a leia essa verblgu algerlega hj sr, egar veri er a kvea fyrir um strivexti. Viskiptabankarnir gera a a sjlfsgu ekki.

A auki reikna g me a bankarnir muni geta boi hagstari ln til viskiptalfsins og einstaklinga, en eir gera dag.

En eins og kemur fram Peningamlum, er eftirspurn eftir tlnum sraltil - sem bendir til a veri eim, .e. vextirnir, s of htt fyrir markainn.

Skv. lgmli frambos og eftirspurnar, er lkningin vi skorti eftirspurn a a lkka ver.


Meira r Peningamlum

  • "Raungengi hefur haldi fram a hkka essu ri og nemur hkkunin tpum 11% a sem af er ri. Enn er a 22% lgra en mealraungengi undanfarinna rjtu ra."
etta eru ekki endilega eingngu gar frttir, v etta stular a auknum innflutningi, en plan AGS og rkisstj. krefst mikils afgangs af viskiptum vi tlnd.
  • "tla er a tflutningur vru og jnustu dragist saman um rmlega 1% essu ri...sta samdrttarins er einkum meiri samdrttur tflutningsframleislu sjvarafura en ur var vnst...og meiri samdrttur tfluttri jnustu."
Afgangur af viskiptum vi tlnd er ekki af vldum aukningar tflutnings heldur mikils samdrttar innflutningi er var kjlfar hrunsins.
  • " spnni er gert r fyrir a afgangur af vru- og jnustuviskiptum nemi 9,6% af vergri landsframleislu essu ri..."
  • Tlur um stu bankakerfisins benda "til ess a tlnavxtur s ltill sem enginn."
etta er augljslega afleiing vaxtastefnu Selabanka, en skv. lgmli frambos og eftirspurnar bendir skortur eftirspurn til ess a verlag vru s of htt.
  • "Undirliggjandi viskiptaafgangur, btt viskiptakjr og lkkun httulags fjrskuldbindingar rkissjs hafa a undanfrnu stula a styrkingu krnunnar."
Me rum orum, a eru ekki vextirnir sem eru a hkka krnuna, en Mr hefur haldi v fram a hir vextir su nausynlegir til a styja vi krnuna. essu er haldi einnig mjg fast fram a eim, er segja a a veri a skipta um gjaldmiil.
  • "Fr tgfu Peningamla snemma ma hefur gengi styrkst n nokkurra inngripa Selabankans gjaldeyrismarkai sem nemur...Mia vi viskiptavegna gengisvsitlu...um 8%."
.e. elilegt a gengi krnu hkki egar afgangur er af utanrkisverslun, v streyma meiri vermti inn landi en t r v - sem arf a skipta krnur, annig a eftirspurn eftir krnum eykst sem samrmi vi lgml frambos og eftirspurnar hkkar veri .e. gengi krnunnar.
  • "Fasteignamarkaurinn hefur heldur glst a sem af er essu ri samanbori vi sama tmabil fyrra. annig er uppsfnu velta jl fasteignamarkai um 21% meiri en sasta ri, tt hn s enn afar lg sgulegu samhengi."
.e. gott t af fyrir sig, en markaurinn er enn nlgt sgulegu lgmarki.
  • "Innlend eftirspurn drst saman um 2% milli ra."
Samdrttur eftirspurnar hagkerfinu heldur fram.
  • "Neikvtt framlag utanrkisviskipta til hagvaxtar hafi fr me sr a samdrttur landsframleislu var...6,9%" fyrsta rsfjrungi.
Me rum orum, tflutningur skrapp saman sem drg r landsframleislu.
  • "A llu samanteknu er v sp a vxtur einkaneyslu veri heldur minni essu ri en sp var ma ea um 0,5%..." - "S liti til rstarleirttrar einkaneyslu drst hn einnig ltillega saman fr fyrri rsfjrungi, ea um 0,6%" - " uppfrri sp er fram reikna me rssamdrtti rum fjrungi sem nemur 1,5%."
Enn er Selabankinn a vonast eftir a aukin umsvif atvinnulfinu auki kaup fyrirtkja jnustu af hverjum rum, .s. af er ri hafi ekki bla neinni slkri aukningu.
  • "Skatttekjur rkissjs voru 14 ma.kr. undir tlun fyrstu sex mnuum essa rs. Lgri tekjur af veltuskttum skra frviki a mestu"
etta er ekkert undarlegt mia vi a samdrttur hafi veri verulegur hagkerfinu rsgrundvelli fyrri hluta rs.
  • "...kann a a hafa hrif fjrlagavinnu fyrir nsta r ar sem markmiinu um jkvan frumjfnu verur a n nsta ri samkvmt efnahagstlun stjrnvalda og Aljagjaldeyrissjsins."
  • "Afgerandi breyting hefur ori run tgjalda ar sem tgjld til samneyslunnar hafa stai sta kringum 100 ma.kr. a nafnviri hverjum fjrungi fimm rsfjrunga r."
hugavert a rtt fyrir allan niurskur s rangurinn ekki meiri.
  • "Enn rkir mikil vissa um framgang tlara strijuframkvmda. eirri sp sem hr er birt er reikna me a framkvmdir sem tla var ma a yru vi Helguvkurverksmijuna r flytjist a mestu leyti yfir nsta r. Framkvmdum sem tlaar voru runum 2011 og 2012 hefur einnig veri hlira til tma um sem nemur u..b. einu ri. er einnig ljst a nokku dregur r framkvmdum vi orkuvinnslu r. Samanlagt hefur etta fr me sr a fjrfesting striju verur svipu krnum tali r og sasta ri en a magni til er gert r fyrir um 15% aukningu milli ra sta 45% ma. essi tilfrsla gerir a a verkum a aukningin verur meiri en ella nsta ri en heldur minni ri 2012. Aukning tflutningi strijuafura seinkar me samsvarandi htti."
Augljsa bendingin er a alls ekkert er ruggt me a a stryjuframkvmdir fari af staa nsta ri heldur. mun s aukning fjrfestinga ekki skila sr nsta ri. A auki, munu eir urfa a reikna niur anna sinn vntingar um hagvxt.
  • "Vsbendingar eru um a almenn atvinnuvegafjrfesting s a taka vi sr n...Innflutningur fjrfestingarvru jkst tluvert rum fjrungi rsins eftir stugan samdrtt fr v rinu 2006. Samanlagt jkst innflutningur fjrfestingarvru um 15% a magni fyrri hluta essa rs fr sama tma fyrra..."
a hefur veri bent , a str hluti essa s "inventorying" .e. endurnjun byrga. En ekki lklegt a fyrra og hittefyrra hafi minna en vanalega veri keypt, og a n hafi ekki lengur veri hgt a draga endurnjun vru er keypt hafi veri fyrir kreppu.
  • "...tla er a fjrmunamyndun heild dragist saman um tplega 4% r..."
  • "Mia vi mat Hagstofu slands rstarsveiflu landsframleislunnar tk hn a vaxa milli rsfjrunga strax fjra rsfjrungi sasta rs og hlt fram a vaxa fyrsta rsfjrungi essa rs. Samkvmt v virist efnahagsbatinn egar hafinn..."

etta er mjg skemmtilegt en skv. rstaleirttingu var smvegis hagvxtur fyrsta rsfjrungi en ef eirri rstaleirttingu er sleppt, mia vi ri heild var samdrttur 6,9% fyrsta fjrungi. S tala passar san vel vi .s. fram hefur komi, a skatttekjur drgust saman .e. veltuskattar fyrst og fremst.

Spurning er, hvernig a tlka etta?

  • "Hafa verur ann fyrirvara a mikil vissa er um rstarsveiflu landsframleislunnar hr landi vegna venjumikillar reglu rsfjrungsbreytingum hennar. essi vissa er jafnvel enn meiri um essar mundir vegna eirra miklu breytinga sem fylgja hagsveifluskilunum."
etta segir me rum orum a rstaleirttum tlum beri a taka me "FYRIRVARA".
  • "Eins og ur hefur komi fram mldist 6,9% rssamdrttur landsframleislu fyrsta fjrungi rsins. Uppfr sp gerir r fyrir a smm saman muni draga r rssamdrttinum eftir v sem lur ri og rija fjrungi taki hn a vaxa n fr fyrra ri fyrsta skipti fr rum rsfjrungi ri 2008."
etta er hugavert - en Hagstofa, rkisstj. og fjlmilar, hafa tala um hagvxt egar hafinn.
  • "Gert er r fyrir 1,9% samdrtti (landsframleislu) essu ri..."
  • "Gert er r fyrir 2,4% hagvexti 2011...og 1,7% hagvexti 2012. Minni vxtur innlendrar eftirspurnar nsta ri og veikari tflutningur ri 2012 vegna tafa strijufjrfestingu skra essar breytingar a mestu leyti."

etta eru verulega lkkaar tlur mia vi fyrri spr Selabanka. N fyrst er maur a nlgast a, a tra eirra tlum. En, egar eir voru a tala um 3,4% hagvxt einfaldlega tri g v ekki.

Ef ekkert verur af strframkvmdum, mun hagvxtur lklega fram halda essu strggli milli 1% og 2% - .e. svo lengi sem ofurskuldsetning heimila og fyrirtkja bremsa hagkerfi af.

  • "tlit er fyrir a framleisluslakinn veri heldur minni framan af tmabilinu en sp var ma og veri um 4% r..."
  • "Vinnuaflseftirspurn jkst alla mlikvara rum fjrungi rsins, fyrsta sinn fr v rinu 2007." - " eirri sp sem n er birt er ekki gert r fyrir a aukningin s vsbending um run nstu fjrunga og vinnuaflseftirspurn aukist v ekki milli ra fyrr en um mitt nsta r."
Einhver aukning eftirspurn eftir vinnuafli virist hafa tt sr sta.
  • "Atvinnuleysi, eins og a er skr hj Vinnumlastofnun, minnkai um tpa prsentu milli fjrunga rum rsfjrungi og mldist 8,3%."
  • "Atvinnuleysi er lklega jafn miki ea meira en a var sama tma fyrra ar sem breytingar aferum vi treikning atvinnuleysis og breytingar atvinnuleysisbtartti hafa fr me sr a atvinnuleysi mlist um -1 prsentu minna en ella r."
etta er mjg "sneaky" af rkisstj. .e. a breyta reglum um atvinnuleysisskrningu og halda v svo fram a minnkun atvinnuleysis r rmu 9% tp 8% s vsbending um batnandi efnahag.
  • "Gert er r fyrir a atvinnuleysi aukist nokku haust- og vetrarmnuum og veri hst 9% fyrsta fjrungi nsta rs, en minnki smm saman eftir v sem efnahagsumsvif aukast..."
Sem ir cirka 10% ef mia er vi gmlu reglurnar .e. svipa og a fr hst fyrra.
  • "Vsitala neysluvers lkkai um 0,66% jl eftir a hafa lkka um 0,33% jn." - "rstarleirtt riggja mnaa verblga rsgrunni mldist -2,3% jl og hefur minnka r 6,8% aprl."
  • "Mealverblga rinu 2010 verur 5,7% ef essi sp gengur eftir, samanbori vi 12% mealverblgu sasta ri."
  • "Sp er a verblga veri vi verblgumarkmi Selabankans rum fjrungi nsta rs..." og au eru 2,2%.

Niurstaa

a er vart hgt a segja a stefni rfandi gang hagkerfinu, en .e. ekki undarlegt mia vi a alvarleg skuldastaa heimila og fyrirtkja virkar sem mjg flugar bremsur getu til hagvaxtar. Reyndar svo flugar, a g er fremur hissa a nokkur hreyfing muni eiga sr sta.

.s. vekur mest athygli mna er a reglum Vinnumlastfnunar um skrningu atvinnulausra hafi veri breytt sem skv. Selabanka skri mismunin tlum yfir fj. atvinnulausra fyrra og r - .e. lkkun um cirka 1% skrist ef reglubreytingunni en s ekki vsbending um raunverulega fkkun atvinnulausra.

Rkisstj. og stuningsmenn hennar, hafa samt veri a beita essum tlum til a villa fyrir almenningu um a, a hlutir su a batna - en lygi me tlum er gmul brella.

A lokum, treka g umru er g vihef um vexti og hvet flk til a hugsa um .s. g sagi um vexti, og hvort v finnst .s. g sagi rkrtt!.

Kv.


Moodies bendir mguleika ess, a Bandar. missi AAA einkunn, ef skuldir halda fram a hlaast upp. hinn bginn, veit enginn hvort a raunverulega hefi afleiingar!

Eins og margir hafa bent , hefur Moodie's samt rum aljlegum matsfyrirtkjum misst miki af snum trverugleika - .e. full langt gengi a segja a ekkert s a marka au.

  • En, hrif eirra og hrif einkunnagjafar eirra, er samt auvelt a ofmeta.
  • hinn bginn eru hir aljlegir hagfringar almennt s sammla um, a vaxandi skuldir Bandar. su til lengri tma lti sjlfbrar - en, enginn veit hvenr markaurinn fer a kyrrast.

Eins og sst a nean, vera skuldir rkissjs Bandar. komnar rmlega 100% af jarfremleislu ri 2014 og skuldir Bretlands vera nrri 100%.

http://einarbb.blog.is/users/72/einarbb/img/government_debt.png

Stra vandamli, fyrir utan hugsanlegann tta fjrfesta, eru vaxtagjld - en mikill kostnaur vaxtagjld er skattf borgaranna er ntist hagkerfinu engan htt. a ir a minna f verur eftir til allra hluta, af heildarskattpeningnum. etta skiptir raunverulegu mli.

Fyrir nean m sj hvernig vaxtagjld bandar. rkisins munu vaxa nstu rin skv. sp stj.v. Washington.

http://einarbb.blog.is/users/72/einarbb/img/us_debt.gif

hugavert er a taka hlisjn af nverandi vaxtagjldum slands og nokkurra valdra OECD rkja skv. tlum fr OECD.

Taki eftir vaxtagjldum rkisstj. Grikklands, lands sem almennt dag er tala um sem gjaldrota.

hinn bginn hefur rkisstj. Japans skuldir upp u..b. 200% n ess a s skuldastaa hafi leitt til vandra fyrir rkissj Japans vi a a fjrmagna sig. Skuldabrf Japans eru enn eftistt og ykja ekki mjg httusm.

En aftur, hinn bginn, minnkar a verulega httu Japan, hve sparnaur Japana er enn hlutfallslega mikill - og miklu meiri en bandarkjamanna. Rkisstj. Japans einnig mjg umtalsverar eignir sem hgt er a koma ver, tla a.m.k. 100% af jarframleislu r eignir sem su auseljanlegar.

essari tflu, aftasti liur, m sj tlun yfir hve miki rkissjir tiltekinna landa urfa a skera niur af opingerum tgjldum, til a n brilegu jafnvgi.

http://einarbb.blog.is/users/72/einarbb/img/fical-pain-league-table.jpg


Hversu varasm er essi skuldasfnun?
  • Augljsa svari er a a veit enginn!

egar maur skoar umruna vefnum, fjlmilum erlendis og var, skiptast menn 2. aalfylkingar .e. sem telja skuldakreppu og hrun nsta leiti, og hinum kantinum sem ganga jafnvel svo langt a halda fram a ekkert s a ttast.

En hver er sannleikurinn?

Hann er einfaldlega s, a etta veit enginn.

Vi erum a lifa tma .s. mjg greinilega er veri a framkvma mjg hugavera tilraun af stjv. inrkja heimsins, .e. hve miki geta skuldir hkka n strfelldra vandra.

Jafnvel a vri satt, a skuldir geti hkka endalaust n ess a markaurinn fari taugum, verur ekki undan v vikist, a vaxtagjld ta stugt upp vaxandi hlutfall fjrlaga v hrri sem skuldirnar eru.

Og, g neita a tra ru en v, a magn skulda s raunverulega takmrk sett, jafnvel fyrir Bandarkin.

Moodies varar vi a egar vaxtagjld rkisstj. Bandar. ni 18% geti a leitti til lkkunar einkunnagjafar.

hinn bginn veit ekki nokkur maur, hvort a hefi yfirhfu nokkur hrif.

dag, hefur vaxtakrafa bandar. skuldabrfa sennilega aldrei veri lgri - en, hinn bginn, virist a fremur stafa af v a fjrfestar eru meira hrddir vi ara fjrfestingarkosti, frekar en a a fjrfestar su a lsa yfir einhverju srstku trausti bandar. rkisskuldabrfum.

g veit a .e. ekki hgt a komast a nokkurri endanlegri niurstu, nema v a vi sum n a reifa okkur gegnum a ekkta.

  • Eitt er vst, a flestir hir hagfringar telja, a s tmapunktur muni koma, a markaurinn kyrrist vegna skuldastu bandar. - en enginn veit akkrat hvenr.
  • Anna er vst, a v llegri sem hagvxtur Bandar. verur v fyrr mun etta gerast - og njustu tlur sna minnkandi hagvxt.
  • Ef kreppa snr til baka n, getur skuldastaan versna mun hraar en tlur Bandar.stj. a ofan gefa til kynna.

Kv.


Nsta sa

Um bloggi

Einar Björn Bjarnason

Höfundur

Einar Björn Bjarnason
Einar Björn Bjarnason
Stjórnmála- og Evrópufræðingur. Áhugi á stjórnmálum, Evrópumálum, alþjóðamálum, málefnum Miðausturlanda, trúmálum, vísindum og tækni, og margt fleira.
Des. 2017
S M M F F L
          1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
31            

Njustu myndir

  • NZ
  • Additive manufacturing
  • f-nklaunch-g-20170515

Heimsknir

Flettingar

  • dag (18.12.): 109
  • Sl. slarhring: 240
  • Sl. viku: 1163
  • Fr upphafi: 615950

Anna

  • Innlit dag: 83
  • Innlit sl. viku: 972
  • Gestir dag: 78
  • IP-tlur dag: 77

Uppfrt 3 mn. fresti.
Skringar

Innskrning

Ath. Vinsamlegast kveiki Javascript til a hefja innskrningu.

Hafu samband