Talsmaður eins stærsta fjármálafyrirtækis í heimi segir, "ósjálfbær stefnumörkun muni leiða til uppbrots Evrusvæðis"!

Þetta er nánar tiltekið Andrew Bosomworth yfirmaður starfsemi PIMCO í Evrópu. En PIMCO er eitt af stærstu fjármálafyrirtækjum í heimi, og þ.e. tekið eftir því á mörkuðum þegar þeirra talsmenn opna munninn.

Um PIMCO: "PIMCO had over $1.3 trillion of assets under management at the end of September 2010." - "It now oversees investments totaling more than $1 trillion on behalf of a wide range of clients, including millions of retirement savers, public and private pension plans, educational institutions, central banks, foundations and endowments, among others."

Bissness þeirra er klárlega sá, að sjá um að ávaxta fé annarra. Og þeir eru klárlega orðnir stærstir í þessari tilteknu hliðargrein fjármálaheimsins sbr. "Pimco, the world's largest bond fund".

En, þetta einmitt gerir þeirra orð mark á takandi, þ.s. þ.e. þeirra sérgrein að vera stöðugt að greina markaðinn út um allan heim, svo þeir geti tekið réttar viðskipta ákvarðanir fyrir sína viðskiptamenn.

 

Pimco says 'untenable' policies will lead to eurozone break-up : "Andrew Bosomworth, head of Pimco's portfolio management in Europe, said current policies are untenable in the absence of fiscal union and will lead to a break-up of the euro. " - ""Greece, Ireland and Portugal cannot get back on their feet without either their own currency or large transfer payments,"" - ""He said these countries could rejoin EMU "after an appropriate debt restructuring", adding that devaluation would let them export their way back to health."" - ""Can countries inside a fixed exchange-rate system like the euro grow and tighten budget policy at the same time? I don't think so. It didn't work in Argentina," Mr Bosomworth said." 

 

Þarna segir hann þ.s. fjöldi hagfræðinga er að vara við, þ.e. að planið sem Írland og Grikkland hafi verið sett undir geti ekki gengið upp.

Annað af tvennu þurfi að gerast:

1. Þau yfirgefi Evruna.
2. Að þau fái mikinn fjárhagslegann stuðning án skilyrða þ.e. gjafafé, frá öðrum aðildarlöndum Evrusvæðis.

PIMCO er að kalla eftir því að aðildarlönd Evrunnar gangist fyrir stofnun sameiginlegs fjárhags. Án þess gangi dæmið ekki upp!

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard: Self-righteous Germany must accept a euro-debt union or leave EMU

"a debt union, funded by Eurobonds; a calibrated jubilee on traditional IMF lines for Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and if necessary Spain, to occur in parallel with austerity cuts; and a monetary blitz by the European Central Bank to prevent the victims tipping into core deflation, even this stokes inflation of 4pc or 5pc in northern Europe." - "If the Teutonic bloc cannot accept such a political revolution, it should withdraw from monetary union before inflicting any more damage to the social fabric of southern Europe"

 

Stóri punkturinn er sá að ástandið á Evrusvæðinu er orðið það alvarlegt, að eina leiðin til að forða því að Evrusvæðið segi bæ, bæ - a.m.k. í núverandi mynd - á fyrri hluta næsta árs, er að hrint verði í framkvæmd mjög yfirgripsmikilli sameiginlegri björgunaráætlun.

Tíminn er að renna út og það hratt. Þetta getur verið orðið of seint jafnvel þegar eftir miðjan janúar nk.

Þetta er orðið einfaldlega svona: Sameinaðir stöndum vér sundraðir föllum vér!

 

Afleiðingar af hruni Evrunnar verða mjög hrikalegar. Engin Evrópuþjóð, við meðtalin, mun sleppa ósködduð efnahagslega frá því! 

Kv.

Athugasemdir

[Stefán Júlíusson (IP-tala skráð) 21.12.2010 kl. 01:16]

Það er verið að vinna í þessu.  Það var samþykkt að koma á  föstum "evrubjörgunarsjóði" og leysa þann sjóð af sem settur var á til bráðabirgða.

Angela Merkel segir að þetta og fleira muni leiða af sér sameiginlega hagstjórn á evrusvæðinu og ESB.

Það þarf auðvitað að passa upp á það að þjóðirnar missi ekki "fullveldi" sitt við þetta.

En ég les bara þýsk nettímarit og hér er grein út www.faz.net.

[Einar Björn Bjarnason, 21.12.2010 kl. 09:07]

Sá sjóður er fullkomlega gagnslaus, þ.s. hann tekur gildi einungis frá 2013. Ákvæði hans gilda einungis fyrir nýjar skuldir gefnar út frá gildistöku.

Hann skilar því alls engum áhrifum fyrir þ.s. skiptir máli, sem er núverandi skuldastaða.

Engum í reynd, fyrir núverandi kreppu. Er ágætur ef Evran lifir núverandi kreppu af, en þá þarf hún fyrst að gera það.

Þessi niðurstaða voru sár vonbrigði, því þetta þíðir að enn hafa engar viðbótar aðgerðir til að eiga við þessa kreppu sem allt er að drepa verið innleiddar.

Kv.

[Stefán Júlíusson (IP-tala skráð) 21.12.2010 kl. 13:25]

Þetta er misskilningur.  Þessi sjóður tekur við af þeim sem nú er starfandi.  Nú verður hann aðeins ekki til bráðabirgða.  Það er alltaf hægt að breyta reglum núverandi sjóðs.  Það eru líkur á því að sá sjóður verður stækkaður.  Það liggur allavega fyrir að ESB ríkin munu takast á við þessa kreppu eins og önnur ríki.   Það er verið að horfa fram á veginn og leysa þetta mál.  

[Einar Björn Bjarnason, 21.12.2010 kl. 20:21]

Skv. öllum þeim fréttum sem ég hef lesið, tekur hann gildi frá og með 2013. 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/14b22126-0948-11e0-ada6-00144feabdc0.html

"The amendment, which must be ratified by all 27 member states, allows for eurozone countries to create a permanent rescue fund in 2013, the most concrete change in EU institutions since the debt crisis began threatening the single currency early this year."

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/8215358/Pimco-says-untenable-policies-will-lead-to-eurozone-break-up.html

European Union leaders have agreed to create a permanent financial safety net from 2013 and the European Central Bank moved to increase its firepower to fight the debt crisis that has rocked the euro zone. 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12014385

The 27 leaders, meeting in Brussels on Thursday, agreed that in 2013 the permanent mechanism would succeed the eurozone's 750bn-euro (£637bn; $1tn) temporary bail-out fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).

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Sá gamli starfi þangað til. 

Þetta er þ.s. markaðurinn er að kvarta yfir. Nýi sjóðurinn eigi að höndla með krýsur framtíðarinnar. En, ekkert sé enn verið að gera - til að eiga við þessa.

Kv.

[Einar Björn Bjarnason, 21.12.2010 kl. 20:31]

Lestu þessa grein - Wolfgang Munchau:

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I have been observing the European Union for a while, but I have rarely seen a political victory as total and far-reaching as that of Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, last week. As one seasoned observer put it, Ms Merkel was the only one in the European Council who knew what she wanted. And she got exactly that. She got an amendment to the Lisbon treaty, which says that any crisis mechanism can only be triggered as a last resort option. She got agreement on her nine points on a future crisis mechanism – intergovernmental, with preservation of the national veto, with collective action clauses to wipe out bondholders, and with strict conditionality. And she utterly defeated any attempt to extend the ceiling and the scope of the existing crisis mechanism. Not one of the other leaders dared suggest a eurozone bond. Last week, the EU became a fully paid-up subscriber to the German version of crisis management – adjustment through deficit-cutting, and if necessary, through deflation.

I would expect that the EU will choke on it.

The reason the Council acts this way is as alien to observers outside the EU as it is natural to insiders. The economic governance of the eurozone is based on three pillars: price stability, fiscal stability and flexible labour markets. In some idealised setting, these should be sufficient criteria to ensure sustainability, though not at a time like this. So when José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, on Thursday outlined his vision of how the eurozone would get out of this crisis, the three predictable points he made were: more price stability, more fiscal discipline and more structural reforms.

But let us take a step back. What we are dealing with is an interlinked sovereign and financial solvency crisis, with further interlinkages across member states. The crisis was caused – except in Greece – by large and persistent intra-eurozone private sector imbalances between the centre and the periphery, which gave rise to large financial flows and bubbles. The European response is not to address the problem directly but to insist on fiscal discipline and structural reforms. This is typical of the economic policy mindset in Brussels. Ask whatever question you like, the answer is always structural reforms and fiscal discipline.

Even if this were the right answer, what never ceases to amaze me is a total lack of interest in the dynamics. What if everyone jumped into austerity at the same time? Most eurozone policymakers come from small open economies. What each small country does has no impact on the rest of the world. But it is different when they act as a group, and if that group constitutes the world’s second-largest economy. That is one reason why policies must be co-ordinated. A country needs to take its neighbour’s policy into account, when formulating its own, and the world economy as well.

So where will this lead us? The policy will trigger a much stricter trajectory of deficit-cutting than what most governments had planned so far. Countries, especially those on the periphery, will be keen to achieve primary surpluses relatively quickly, to reduce the kind of funding stress several eurozone countries will be subject to next year. Through the European financial stability facility, funding is guaranteed until 2013. If they do not achieve primary surpluses by that time, they might find themselves in severe difficulty.

The problem is that they cannot get there simply through savage budget cuts alone because austerity also affects the government’s tax income. Of course, it should be technically possible to make cuts of such a magnitude that their effects will always outweigh the negative impact of lower tax receipts. This is what happened in Latvia – a rare case of a country that has chosen the hard way to adjust to a crisis without default and devaluation. But can Latvia be a model for Ireland, Portugal and Greece, let alone Spain? Would electorates in those countries tolerate a decade of austerity for the price of staying in a monetary union with Germany? It is not impossible, but I find it hard to imagine. So far, proper austerity has not really started anywhere, not even in Greece, which has already witnessed some violent demonstrations. The way electorates react to austerity will depend very much on whether governments can produce plausible scenarios for the crisis to end. I have yet to hear one. Portugal, Ireland and Greece all claim to be solvent on the basis of unrealistic assumptions about future economic growth.

A comparatively successful example of real adjustment has been post-unification Germany, of course. But lest we forget, Germany put up an estimated €1,600bn in net transfer payments over a period of 20 years after unification, according to one estimate. If there is one country that knows about the difficulties of real adjustment, it must be Germany. German policymakers know better than others that real adjustment in a monetary union requires large-scale fiscal transfers.

So why are they rejecting a “transfer union” then? When it came to unification, Germany wanted to make it work – no matter what. That was the policy. And it was credible. The integrity of the eurozone is also a German policy goal, but not of the same order of magnitude. Having prioritised unification in the past 20 years, Germany is now prioritising limited liability.

Ms Merkel is doing whatever it takes in the pursuit of that goal. On Thursday, she succeeded.

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Kv.

[Einar Björn Bjarnason, 21.12.2010 kl. 20:32]

2. athugasemdin mín var 100% rétt skv. minni bestu vitneskju.

K.