Bandaríkin hafa hafið átak til að efla samskipti sín við og áhrif sín á ríki SA-Asíu!

Áhugaverðir hlutir virðast í gangi í tengslum við samskipti Bandaríkjanna og SA-Asíu. En í agúst virðist sem að átak Bandar. til að efla á ný áhrif sín, og dýpka samskipti sín við ríki SA-Asíu, hafi verið hleypt af stokkunum.

• Þ.s. stingur mest í stúf, er að Bandar. hafa ákveðið að taka á ný upp stjórnmálasamband við Myanmar. Indverjar hafa víst einnig nýverið opnað eigin sendiráð þar.

• Næsta atriði, er að Bandaríkin hafa ákveðið að styðja kjarnorkuvæðingu í Víetnam, sem á víst að vera til friðsamlegrar raforkuframleiðslu eingöngu.

• En, einhvern veginn grunar mig, að ef seinna kemur í ljós, að Víetnam er allt í einu orðið kjarnorkuveldi, þá verði Bandar. ívið minna pirruð á því, en núverandi plönum Írana.

• Þeir ætla einnig að ræsa átak til aðstoðar ríkjum við Mekongfljót þ.e. Tailand og Laos, við það að ná meiri nýtingu úr því mikla vatnsfalli. Samskipti eiga einnig að verða nánari við Kambútseu.

• Sem sagt, fyrri áherslum um að eingangra ríki er fremja mannréttindabrot er kastað fyrir róða.

Einhvern veginn, er ég ekki mjög - mjög hissa. En, Kína hefur með engum hætti látið slík atriði stöðva sín plön, eða jafnvel hægja á þeim.

Núna virðist sem að bæði Bandar. og Indland, hafi komist bæði tvö að þeirri niðurstöðu, að þau ríki hafi ekkert annað val en að mæta vaxandi veldi Kína hvar sem þeir eru að efla sín áhrif innan SA-Asíu.

Af hverju er SA-Asía svo mikilvæg?

Þetta snýst um siglingaleiðir. En, ríki SA-Asíu mynda þrengingar sem hægt er með hægðarleik beita til að skapa mjög stór vandræði við siglingar. Þetta sést ef kostið er skoðaða, að löndin á því svæði mynda hindranir á milli sem eru mjó sund, sem óvinsamir aðilar geta hagnýtt sér.

Þ.s. grundvöllur veldis Bandar. er drottnun á heimshöfunum til að tryggja öruggar siglinga kaupskipa þar yfir, þá hafa þeir áhyggjur af þeim raunverulega möguleika að Kína takist að gera mörg þessara ríkja að nokkurs konar leppríkjum sínum.

Myanmar er þegar langleiðina þangað komið, en þar hafa Kínverjar nú byggt stóra flotastöð og eru í miðjum klíðum að byggja upp mikið vegakerfi frá þeim höfnum, til innhéraða Kína. En, ef þið horfið á kortið þá sjáið þið að þ.e. raunverulega styttri vegalengd frá höfnum í Myanmar til tiltekinna héraða í SV-Kína en frá höfnum á eigin strönd Kína.

Að auki eru þær hafnir einnig mun styttra frá olíuhöfnunum við Persaflóa, svo það væri einnig mjög hentugt fyrir Kína að skipa þar upp olíu og svo flytja hana með pípum restina af leiðinni.

Eitt enn áhugavert sem í gangi er, eru plön Kínv. í með leyfi Tailenskra stjv. að grafa skipaskurð í gegnum Malakkaskaga þ.s. hann er mjóstur áður en kemur að landamærum við Malasíu, en það einnig auðveldar siglingar til Kína frá Persaflóa. Að auki, þurfa þau skip ekki lengur að sigla framjá Malasíu, þ.s. áhrif Kínv. eru minni og möguleiki til að verði óvinsamlegt Kína.

Eina landið sem á raunverulega séns að standa í hárinu á Kína er Víetnam svo þ.e. ef til vill ekki undarlegt að Bandar. velji að leggja höfuðáherslu á að efla það land.

Samt sem áður ætla þeir að einbeita sér að öllum ríkjunum.

 

Það verður að koma í ljós hve mikill árangur verður af þessu átaki.

En, Bandar. eru í dag að súpa nokkurt seyði af ofurfókus Bush stjórnarinnar á Persaflóa og Írak, svokallað stríð gegn hryðjuverkum. Fyrir bragðið var lítil áhersla á að bregðast við vaxandi áhrifum Kína, eða nánar tiltekið, lítil orka aflögu til þeirra hluta.

Það verður að koma í ljós hve mikla orku aflögu Bandar. raunverulega hafa, þ.s. enn eru þeir í stríði í Afganistan og enn með herafla í Írak, þó allar svokallaðar bardagasveitir séu farnar, þá er þar enn fjölmennur mannskapur af öðru tagi.

Það má vera að þeir neyðist til að fókusa á það land þ.s. einna helst er séns að hægt sé að byggja upp þannig að það geti staðist vaxandi áhrif Kína. En það er Víetnam og síðan lönd lengra í suðri eins og Malasía og Indónesía.

Ég er fremur skeptískur á að Bandar. geti ná miklu fram í Myanmar, sem þegar virðist nánast orðið alveg að kínv. hjálendu. Áhrif Kínv. á Thailand virðast einnig hafa vaxið mjög mikið, og getur einnig reynst erfitt þar að vinda nokkuð ofan.

Samt, ég hugsa að Bandar. hafi enn möguleika hið minnsta til að hægja á vexti áhrifa Kína á SA-Asíu.

Á sama tíma, er Indland einnig að hefja eigið átak, t.d. á Myanmar. En, þeir hafa áhyggjur af því ríki, enda Myanmar með landamæri að Indlandi. Kínv. einnig hafa flotastöð í Pakistan, og Indverjar hafa eðlilega áhyggjur af því að Kína sé að umkringja þá með sínu veldi - sínum vaxandi áhrifum.

Það má því reikna með að á næstu árum muni spennan á þessu svæði og á Indlandshafi fara hratt vaxandi. En, Indverjar eru að byggja upp eigin flotastöðva á eyjum Indlandshafs, hugsaðar sem nokkurs konar varnargirðing ef kemur til hugsanlegt stríðs við Kína.

Bandaríkin eru svona mitt á milli - og líklegt að Indland og Bandar. sjái sér hag af samstarfi.

 

Kv.

 

------------------------Sjá að neðan analísu STRATFOR

U.S., China: Conflicting Interests in Southeast Asia

 

August 12, 2010 | 1216 GMT

Summary

The United States and China are increasingly at odds over the former’s aggressive new re-engagement policy in Southeast Asia. Though Washington will not necessarily maintain its current accelerated pace of engagement, Beijing’s resistance to U.S. advances in the region will be a source of increased tension between the two countries.

Analysis

The United States and Vietnam launched a round of joint activities Aug. 8 as part of a commemoration of the 15th anniversary of normalized U.S.-Vietnamese ties in 1995. The United States sent nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington to Da Nang, Vietnam, on Aug. 8 to host talks with Vietnamese officials, and the guided missile destroyer USS John S. McCain arrived Aug. 10 to lead the first-ever joint naval exercises over four days, covering search and rescue, damage control, maintenance, emergency repair and firefighting operations. At the same time, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry confirmed that Hanoi has entered bilateral negotiations with the United States over a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, which has been rumored to involve the United States giving its blessing for Vietnam to enrich uranium on its own soil.

The meeting comes amid heightened tensions over the U.S. presence in China’s near abroad. In recent months, the United States has sped up its re-engagement with Southeast Asia, stirring anxieties in China about U.S. intentions. While the United States will not necessarily maintain its current rapid pace, it appears committed to sustaining this policy in the coming years, contrary to previous bids to rejuvenate its interaction with the region after the post-Cold War hiatus. The American goal is to reassert leadership gradually in the region in economic, political and security affairs. By doing so, the United States would update its strategic posture, increase competition with Chinaand give Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states more confidence and freedom to maneuver on pursuing their interests in the presence of greater powers.

Forms of Re-engagement

The high-profile U.S.-Vietnamese visit and exercises are taking place after a series of recent U.S. moves to increase its stature in the region. In July, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the ASEAN foreign ministers’ summit and emphasized that the United States is genuine about implementing its Southeast Asia re-engagement policy, starting with closer ties to ASEAN.

Clinton pointed to a critical dimension of the policy when she declared that freedom of navigation in maritime Southeast Asia is in the “national interest” of the United States and all states with an interest in stable seaborne trade. She also called for an international resolution mechanism for handling territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. Clinton’s comments drew sharp rebuttals from Chinese officials and state press, highlighting China’s policy that the South China Sea is a sovereign area of “core interest” like Taiwan or Tibet and that territorial disagreements should be handled through bilateral negotiations. Subsequently, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy launched large-scale military exercises in the sea. Clinton’s comments also provoked debate across the region, with the Philippine foreign secretary stating publicly that the United States has no reason to get involved in regional boundary disputes, which rightfully belong to China and ASEAN alone. The statement should not be taken to mean that the Philippines, a U.S. ally, will not play a supportive role in the policy, but it does indicate the ambivalence that Southeast Asian states feel toward the prospect of becoming contested terrain between the United States and China.

The United States has a Pacific coast and an extensive and longstanding interaction with the Asia-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia. Fundamentally, U.S. global power rests on its control of the oceans, which enables it to protect its own shores and intervene selectively abroad to prevent the rise of regional powers. Maritime Southeast Asia is essentially a bottleneck — marked by the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea and other minor routes — through which all commercial and military vessels must pass if they are to transit between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The United States thus seeks to ensure that there is freedom of navigation on international waters, that shipping routes remain open and stable and that no foreign power could seek to deny access to the U.S. Navy. This drives the United States to pursue security ties with regional players, to stem militancy and piracy and to preserve the broader balance of power.

Moreover, Washington has an interest in cultivating strong economic ties with Southeast Asia, which has a population of 500 million, produces natural resources and offers low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing and is hungry for investment to fuel its rapid development. The financial crisis has inspired the United States to expand these ties both to increase its exports and to tap into new sources of growth. Essentially, the region’s economic power is large and growing, and the United States already has a history of trade and security ties with several states. After having played an extremely limited role in the region following the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States is seeking to revive those ties and form new relations with non-allies to reflect changing realities — namely China’s economic and military ascent and increasing assertiveness in the region, especially in the South China Sea.

American engagement with the region is focusing specifically on reinforcing its freedom to operate in international waters and updating relations with official allies like the Philippines and Thailand, strengthening bonds with partners like Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, and forging new ties with states formerly shunned, like Cambodia, Laos and, to a lesser extent, Myanmar. By re-establishing diplomatic relations with Myanmar in 2009, the United States paved the way to improve its interaction with ASEAN as an organization. U.S. President Barack Obama met with the ASEAN heads of state and Secretary Clinton signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009. The United States also established the Lower Mekong Initiative to help Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand with a range of environmental, social and infrastructural issues and pledged to send a permanent ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.

Meanwhile, the United States has stepped up bilateral relations with the ten ASEAN members, including, among other things, pursuing the aforementioned naval and nuclear deals with Vietnam, restoring full military relations with Indonesia to pave the way for enhanced training and assistance, opening up the annual major Cobra Gold military exercises to Malaysia, holding military and security training with Cambodia and opening diplomatic visits with Myanmarand Laos. The United States has also sought to participate in the East Asia Summit, a security grouping that it previously showed little interest in, and has begun negotiations to create a new regional trade bloc called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that will include among its ranks Singapore, Vietnam and Brunei.

China’s View

From the U.S. point of view, this policy not only does not require China’s approval but also is not inherently aggressive toward China. Asserting the need for stability and right of safe passage on international waters can be expected from the naval superpower. Moreover, it falls in line with the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and although China understandably criticizes the United States for not yet ratifying the treaty (which the U.S. Senate does not appear likely to do soon, though it has broad support and was nearly put to vote as recently as 2009), Washington nevertheless argues that it adheres to the principles of the UNCLOS anyway since they are based on older international maritime norms.

On the issue of a multilateral mechanism for resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the United States argues that such disputes pose a risk to international maritime security and that U.S. support for such an initiative merely means supporting a binding agreement based on principles of the ASEAN-China 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea while maintaining its customary neutrality in specific disputes. Similarly, with the Lower Mekong Initiative, the United States claims it intends merely to assist with water resources management and similar issues among states bordering the Mekong. However, China patently rejects what it sees as the “internationalization” of the South China Sea’s territorial disputes, as well as the idea of the United States insinuating itself into bilateral arguments about China’s hydropower projects and their effect on the Mekong’s water levels as a means of setting the smaller countries against Beijing.

The problem for China is that the reassertion of American interests runs directly counter to its national interests and policy for the region, but will prove tough to resist. China has been enjoying stability on its borders with Southeast Asia and rapidly expanding economic ties with these states over the past two decades (and notably after the ASEAN-China free trade agreement took full effect in January). Following a tumultuous 20th century, China’s strength is growing on the back of a surging, albeit imbalanced, economy, and its leaders feel it has only recently met crucial strategic objectives. Namely, it has achieved regime stability and unity in the Han core and has secured its important buffer zones, though it knows this achievement is resting on a shifting foundation and is dangerously at risk from a range of internal and external forces. Still, to maintain and extend these strategic successes, Beijing needs to focus on certain external objectives.

Chief among these objectives are resource security and national defense as they relate to Southeast Asia. As China’s economic dependence on the international system has grown, it has become more reliant on overseas trade, in particular for Chinese exports to consumers and imports of raw materials. Many essential inputs, especially oil from the Middle East and Africa, require transit through Southeast Asia. Long maritime supply lines are inherently vulnerable to disruptions of various kinds, from piracy to terrorism. But there is the added fear that as China becomes stronger, the United States will become more aggressive, and the U.S. Navy — or even other rival navies like that of Japan or possibly India — could someday take hostile action against China’s supply lines. Because China’s social and political stability currently rests on maintaining economic growth, Beijing must think of ways to secure supplies and minimize risks. It has sought to do so in part through continuing to develop domestic natural resources, reducing imbalances and inefficiencies in domestic consumption and pursuing land supply routes through Central Asia and Russia and a hybrid sea-land energy route through Myanmar

 

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Nevertheless, seaborne supplies remain critical, and the chief focus thus becomes the South China Sea. In addition to modernizing its navy, China has concentrated more of its naval resources and strategy on the Southern Fleet based on Hainan Island, the launching platform for projecting naval power farther abroad, from its neighboring seas to the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and East African coast.

Separate from supply line concerns, the South China Sea has inherent value because it holds discovered and potential natural resources, including fishing grounds, oil, natural gas and other mineral deposits, thus intensifying the sovereignty disputes over the Paracel and Spratly islands. In fact, China has already threatened to retaliate against foreign companies cooperating with Vietnam on offshore oil exploration in the sea.

Even aside from the economic and commercial importance of the sea, Beijing has security reasons for reasserting its sovereignty there. Beijing wants to be capable of denying foreign powers the ability to approach the Chinese mainland or assist China’s enemies in the region in the event of conflict. Taiwan remains a longstanding target due to the sovereignty dispute, and Vietnam is a traditional adversary and has aggressively resisted China’s South China Sea strategy, including through the pursuit of Russian submarines and fighter jets.

The U.S. thrust into Southeast Asia thus inherently poses a threat to China’s naval strategy and “core interest” in the South China Sea. China sees greater U.S. involvement as a deliberate attempt to take advantage of its new international dependencies, thwart its expanding influence and form a containment ring around it that can be used to suppress it, or even someday cut off its critical supplies or attack. Moreover, it raises the specter of deepening American involvement in mainland Southeast Asia that could serve as a tool to pressure China on its southern borders, as England and France did in the 19th and early 20th centuries at the height of European colonial power.

Conflicting Interests

The conflict between U.S. and Chinese strategic interests is therefore apparent, but not necessarily urgent. The U.S. re-engagement policy is gaining some momentum, but the United States will not necessarily permanently maintain this accelerated pace. U.S. efforts to reignite interest in Southeast Asia have moved haltingly throughout the past decade. Constraints on the American side as it attempts to extricate itself from Iraq and Afghanistan and develop balances between powers in the Middle East and South Asia suggest limitations on the amount of energy the United States will be able to devote to the policy.

What is clear is that the United States, despite delays, obstacles and other foreign policy priorities, is serious about re-engagement and will remain committed to a gradual process in the coming years. This will create new points of stress and rising competition with China for influence in the region. While neither side is looking to ignite hostilities, previous incidents show that there is potential for mistakes and confrontation. These include the EP-3 incident in 2001, a Chinese submarine surfacing near the USS Kitty Hawk in 2007 and minor confrontations and collisions between Chinese ships and the USNS Impeccableand USS John McCain (the same ship that visited Vietnam in mid-August) in 2009.

Ultimately, however, the United States has the upper hand. It has greater trade and security ties in the region as well as allies like Japan and Europe that also have strong economic ties with ASEAN states. The ASEAN states also have an incentive to attract a distant superpower to give themselves leverage against a potentially threatening and overbearing regional power — especially given the disadvantages of falling on the superpower’s bad side. And Beijing’s ability to compete will continue to be limited by its fragile domestic economic and social stability, given that its political and economic elite are in the midst of deep debates about the future of the country as they vie for better positioning in the generational leadership transition taking place over the coming years. Nevertheless, the United States will be limited in its engagement by the need to maintain bilateral relations with China, by the ASEAN states’ need to maintain a balance in their relations with China and their divisions between themselves, and by Washington’s own decisions and constraints regarding foreign policy priorities.

Overall, the effect of U.S. engagement will be gradually to modernize its strategic footholds in the region, put China on edge about U.S. intentions and give ASEAN states more freedom to maneuver for themselves. This will allow them to hedge against China, but it also will give them the opportunity to play the two countries — and Japan and other interested players — against one another, all while they continue to compete amongst themselves. Beijing can be expected to criticize the American strategy vocally when it takes notable steps, such as naval training with Vietnam, as well as to attempt to accelerate and leverage its own involvement in the region to pursue its interests.

China is not without options. Through its massive economic demand for Southeast Asian goods, aid with little political requirements attached and ability to give out state-supported credit and provide infrastructure construction, it will be able to lure ASEAN states into tighter relations. Its growing economic and military heft will be useful in deterring these states from becoming tools of the United States. Still, since Beijing knows it sits at a disadvantage to Washington if the policy is pursued aggressively, it will be particularly vigilant in watching the pace and means by which the United States pushes forward, especially focusing on military and security cooperation and issues in the South China Sea. China’s vulnerability will make it more reactive to perceived threats, and Southeast Asia will likely become the scene of new flash points in the ongoing saga of U.S.-Chinese tensions.

--------------------------Endir á STRATFOR analísu.

 

Kv.