Evrukrýsan kominn af stað, eina ferðina enn! Lánshæfismat Spánar lækkað. Spenna eykst fyrir fund ráðherra Evrusvæðisríkja í dag föstudag!

Það er alltaf góð spurning hver hefur rétt fyrir sér. En Moody's lækkaði í gær mat sitt á lánshæfi Spánar, og byggir mat sitt einkum á eigin mati á líklegum kostnaði við endurfjármögnun spanskra banka, sem er 2 - falt hærra en mat spanskra stjórnvalda. Spænsk stjórnvöld, svöruðu í gær fullum hálsi - draga í efa að mat Moody's sé nægilega vandað, telja að sjálfsögðu að mat Seðlabanka Spánar sé mun betra.

Að sjálfsögðu er ég ekki með nokkrar forsendur, til að slá eigið mat á hvor skoðunin sé líklega réttari.

Bendi þó á eitt, að fyrir utan Írland var spænska húsnæðisbólan sú hlutfallslega stærsta innan ESB, og miðað við útkomuna á Írlandi, þá myndi ég ætla að húsnæðisverð á Spáni eigi eftir að falla umtalsvert meir en það fram að þessu hefur gert - sem geti framkallað vandræði fyrir bankastofnanir eins og á Írlandi.

Mér finnst merkilegt, að ef þ.e. virkilega svo, að spænskir bankar sleppi að mestu við alvarleg vandræði, miðað við hve rosastór bólan var - sem ætti að þíða rosastór útlánatöp og því álíka stór bankavandræði.

En, skv. spænskum Stórnvöldum er eftirfarandi sannleikurinn:

Spanish bank capital costs – official version

A dozen banks. Including eight cajas. And €15.15bn.

Commercial banks

Bankinter — €333m

Barclays Bank — €552m

Deutsche Bank — €182m

Bankpyme — €8m

Savings banks

Bankia — €5.775bn

Base — €1.447bn

Civica — €847m

Mare Nostrum — €637m

Catalunyacaixa — €1.718bn

Novacaixagalicia — €2.622bn

Caja Espana de Inversiones — €463m

Unnim — €568m

Það kemur ekki á óvart, að svokallaðir "Cajas" eru í vandræðum, en á Spáni hafa sparisjóðir sem á Spáni heita allir Caja eitthvað verið einkum þeir, sem hafa lánað til húsnæðiskaupa. Svo, það fylgir eðlilega að það eru þeir, sem súpa seyðið af spönsku húsnæðisbólunni.

• Eins og fram kemur í yfirlýsingu Moody's telja þeir að kostnaður verði  40-50 ma.€

• Að auki, telja þeir möguleika á að sá kostnaður geti hlaupið á allt að 110-120 ma.€ ef Spánn lendir í sambærilegum húsnæðis-lána vandræðum, og átti sér stað á Írlandi.

• Þeir meta horfur neikvæðar - þannig að meiri líkur en minni séu á frekari lækkun mats síðar.

• Þeir taka þó fram, að stjv. Spánar séu ekki neins staðar nærri bjargbrún fjárhagslegs hengiflug gjaldþrots.

• Ennig, líta þeir svo á, að spænsk stjv. hafi gert margt gott undanfarið ár, í því að laga stöðuna heima fyrir, koma hagkerfinu af stað, draga úr halla á ríkisútjgöldum og halla á viðskiptum landsins við útlönd, o.s.frv.

• Skuldatryggingaálag Spánar hefur einnig lækkað síðustu mánuðina, í takt við lækkandi mat markaðarins, á gjaldþrotshættu spánskra stjv.

Svo ætli maður verði ekki að standa á hliðarlínunni, varðandi spurninguna um það, hvort hafa rétt fyrir sér - starfsmenn Moody's eða starfsmenn Seðlabanka Spánar.

Yfirlýsing Moodies - í heilu lagi:----------------------------------

London, 10 March 2011 — Moody’s Investors Service has today downgraded Spain’s government bond ratings by one notch to Aa2 from Aa1. The outlook on the Aa2 ratings is negative. Today’s rating action concludes the review for possible downgrade, which Moody’s initiated on 15 December 2010. The main triggers for the downgrade are: (1) Moody’s expectation that the eventual cost of bank restructuring will exceed the government’s current assumptions, leading to a further increase in the public debt ratio. (2) Moody’s continued concerns over the ability of the Spanish government to achieve the required sustainable and structural improvement in general government finances, given the limits of central government control over the regional governments’ finances as well as the background of only moderate economic growth in the short to medium term.

The decision to assign a negative outlook to the rating reflects Moody’s view that the risks to Spain’s government finances remain skewed to the downside. Spain’s vulnerability to market disruption remains elevated given the high funding requirements, not only for the sovereign but also for the regional governments and the banks.

Moody’s has today also downgraded the rating of Spain’s Fondo de Reestructuracion Ordenada Bancaria (FROB) to Aa2 from Aa1 with a negative outlook as the FROB’s debt is fully and unconditionally guaranteed by the government of Spain.

Spain’s country ceilings for bonds and bank deposits are unaffected by today’s rating action and remain at Aaa (in line with the Eurozone’s rating). Spain’s P-1 short-term rating is unaffected by today’s rating action. RATINGS RATIONALE The considerations that drove Moody’s to place the ratings of the Kingdom of Spain under review on 15 December 2010 continue to be the rating agency’s main concerns and have triggered today’s rating action. Firstly, Moody’s continues to have concerns over the ultimate cost of recapitalizing the saving banks (“cajas”).

Although Moody’s acknowledges that the government’s recently announced acceleration of efforts to restructure the cajas is likely to strengthen the country’s banking landscape, the rating agency believes there is a meaningful risk that the eventual cost of the recapitalization effort could considerably exceed the government’s current projections — and Moody’s own earlier estimates from December 2010 (which were calculated using a minimum tier-1 capital ratio of 8% for all entities). Specifically, the government estimates the cost to be a maximum of €20 billion (less than 2% of GDP), which is based on the capital requirements as percentage of risk-weighted assets as of 31st December 2010.

However, Moody’s believes the overall cost is likely to be nearer to €40-50 billion, reflecting more than twice Moody’s earlier estimates of recapitalization needs of €17 billion because (1) the definition of eligible capital instruments has been tightened, and (2) capital requirements have been raised to a core capital ratio of 10% for those institutions with a limited private investor base and high dependence on wholesale funding. Indeed, Moody’s believes that, in a more stressed scenario, recapitalization needs could increase to approximately €110-120 billion. Secondly, the recently published budget execution data for 2010 revealed that the path to fiscal consolidation remains unclear for some of Spain’s regional governments.

Last year, 9 out of 17 autonomous communities breached the budget deficit target of 2.4% of GDP, some by a wide margin. This casts doubts over the ability of the central government to exercise sufficient control over the regions to ensure compliance with deficit targets. This year’s budget deficit target of 1.3% is significantly more ambitious than that of last year, and the effort required to implement it would be quite unprecedented for many regions. Moody’s expects that the regions will manage to reduce their deficits this year, but observes that most of the improvement will likely come from cuts to capital spending plus reduced personnel expenses due to the freeze in public-sector wages -neither of which are sustainable policies.

Moreover, there are no new policy initiatives to reduce the regions’ structural spending pressures in the areas of healthcare and education, beyond last year’s reduction in pharmaceutical costs and the replacement of only 10% of retiring public-sector workers. In addition to the regional government finances, the social security — which has traditionally recorded a surplus in Spain — also recorded a deficit for the first time since 1998, mainly driven by high outlays for unemployment benefits. This is unlikely to change this year given the outlook for the labour market. Under Moody’s base case assumptions, GDP growth will accelerate only moderately this year (to 0.8% from -0.1% in 2010) and the unemployment rate is expected to remain close to current levels.

Moody’s recognizes the government’s resolve in addressing the country’s key weaknesses, which is a key reason for limiting the downgrade to one notch. The government is accelerating the process of bank recapitalization and has just agreed a pension reform with the trade unions and employers’ association. An important reform to the system of collective bargaining is on the agenda for the end of March at the latest. This should be an important step towards gradually making the labour market more flexible. Moody’s also acknowledges that the government achieved the target set for the general government budget deficit in 2010 (9.24% of GDP versus target of 9.3%) and reduced its own central government deficit by a full percentage point of GDP more than the target (5.66% of GDP versus target of 6.7% in cash terms).

At around 60% of GDP in 2010, Spain’s public debt ratio is lower than that of several important peers, including Germany, France, the UK, Belgium and Italy. Even including the higher estimates for bank recapitalization, Spain’s debt ratio would remain lower than those of Italy (Aa2, stable) and Belgium (Aa1, stable). Moody’s continues to believe that Spain’s debt sustainability is not under threat, and its baseline assumptions do not anticipate a need for the Spanish government to ask for EFSF liquidity support. However, Spain’s substantial funding requirements — not only those of the sovereign, but also those of the regional governments and the banks — make the country susceptible to further episodes of funding stress.

Yfirlýsing Moodies - í heilu lagi:----------------------------------

 

Ég hvet alla til að fylgjast mjög vel með fréttum, af því hvað gerist á fundi ráðherra Evrusvæðis, sem hefst í dag!

Á myndinni sést, að í gær fimmtudaginn 10. mars fór ávöxtunarkrafa fyrir 10. ára Portúgölsk skuldabréf, í 7,68%. Þar sést einnig, að ávöxtunarkrafa fyrir spönsk 10. ára ríkisbréf fór í 5,52%. Ítölsk 10. ára bréf fóru í 4,99%.

Markaðurinn er klárlega orðinn óþolinmóður, að heyra frá aðildarlöndum Evrusvæðis, akkúrat hvernig þau ætla sér að leysa úr krísunni á Evrusvæðinu.

Þangað til að sú lausn kemur, mun sú krýsa áfram halda að hanga yfir hausnum á Evrópu.

En, vonandi verður sú lausn sem fram kemur ef tímaáætlun landanna stenst, að ljúka gerð hennar fyrir næstu mánaðamót, þess eðlis að markaðir kaupi hana sem frambærilega. En, ef ekki - þá getur apríl reynst vera meir spennandi en nokkur maður ætti að óska þess að hann verði.

En í apríl er töluvert af stórum gjalddögum fyrir aðildarríki Evru, sem skýrir af hverju ákveðið var af leiðtogum Evrusvæði í janúar sl. að hafa lausn tilbúna fyrir mánaðamót mars / apríl.

 

Kv.

Athugasemdir

[Júlíus Björnsson, 11.3.2011 kl. 02:17]

Ég tel vegna að reynslu að lánshæfi mat sé nátengt reiðufjár innstreymi þess sem er metin á skammtíma forsendum.

[Júlíus Björnsson, 11.3.2011 kl. 02:24]

Draumurinn um að hækka raunvexti yfir 2,0% á langtíma húsnæðislánum, hefur aldrei gengið upp í sögunni almennt. Ný kynslóð virðist alltaf þurfa að falla í freistni.   

Mikið af húsnæði í sölu á Spáni er svo kallaðir second residence.  Millstéttinn á móti hefur verið að lækka í rauntekjum um alla EU.  1. residence fer síðast á uppboð.