Bloggfrslur mnaarins, oktber 2011

Bjrgunartlun Grikklands send jaratkvi!

etta er glntt tspil Papandreo forstisrherra Grikklands, a halda jaratkvagreislu um bjrgun Grikklands - svokallaa.

Greece calls referendum on EU bail-out

Greece to hold referendum on EU debt deal

Papandreou to Put Loan Plan to Referendum

Greek PM calls referendum on new EU aid deal

George Papandreo - "We trust citizens, we believe in their judgment, we believe in their decision," he told ruling socialist party deputies. "In a few weeks, the (EU) agreement will be a new loan contract ... we must spell out if we are accepting it or if we are rejecting it."

  • "Eurozone leaders agreed last week a second, 130-billion-euro ($180 billion) bailout for the cash-strapped country as well as a 50-percent write-down on its enormous debt to make it sustainable. Opinion polls show most Greeks view the deal negatively."
  • "Papandreou also said he would ask for a vote of confidence to secure support for his policy for the remainder of his four-year term, which expires in 2013."

etta er ekkert minna en sprengi-efni

Segjum a a takist a framkvma essa kosningu nsta mnui ea fyrir mijan desember - sumir fjlmilar tala um janar nk, en .e. heldur seint. En etta arf klrt a framkvma etta me eins miklum hraa og framast er unnt, vegna ess a Grikkland mun enn n urfa a ganga gegnum endurskoun fyrri bjrgunar tlun desember.

Grikkland eina ferina enn, a f greitt - ef a stenst endurskoun.

Og enn einu sinni, reynir ann mguleika - a allt strandi.

En g erfitt me a mynda mr anna en a etta s lokaspil Papandreo, vegna ess a hann hafi ekki geta n ngri samstu um a innan rkisstjrnar Grikklands, a framfylgja llum eim krfum sem aildarrki Evrusvis og Framkvmdastjrn ESB, samt Selabanka ESB og AGS; gera til Grikklands.

Mjg lklega er Papandreo og rkisstjrnin ll orin mjg reitt essari stugu barttu, gegn vaxandi andstu jarinnar.

A einhverju leiti getur a reynst vera viss losun fyrir hana - ef jin afgreiir etta ml fr.

annig, a Papandreo er ekki beint a svkja au htlegu lofor sem hann hefur gefi leitogum hinna msu aildarrkja evrusvis ess efnis a Grikkland muni standa vi sitt; ef jin hefur gefi honum a bakland a hafa sagt "nei".

Niurstaa

Hreint magna lokatspil George Papandreo, a setja a hendur jarinnar hvort Grikkland fylgir v niurskurar prgrammi, sem Grikklandi er gert a framfylgja - skv. annarri bjrgunartlun fyrir Grikkland.

Ef niurstaan er "Nei" - er ekki um anna a ra, en drgmuvingu tafarlaust samt yfirlsingu um greislurot Grikklands.

arf rkisstj. Grikklands eins og rkisstj. slands geri, a taka alla bankana yfir - samtmis v a loka er streymi fjrmagns t landi.

a er ekki hgt a reka land r ESB.

Arar aildarjir geta veri flar - v greisluroti mun valda tjni undirfjrmgnuum bankakerfum. En g s einfaldlega ekki a Grikkir geti haldi a t til margra nstu ra, a halda nverandi vitleysu fram.

Ef g vri Grikki, myndi g v taka seinni valkostinn. svo g viti a a i mjg sngga og djpa dfu fyrir hagkerfi og lfskjr. Hi minnsta, er lfskjarahnignun a mestu afgreidd einu skrefi, sta ess er annars er tlit fyrir a henni veri dreift mrg r, .e. mrg nstu r - allann ann tma a Grikkland mun urfa a fara fr einnig bjrgunartluninni til eirrar nstu.

Binda me rum orum enda vitleysuna - skera kaalinn sem heldur landinu snrunni.

Ps: Mikill rleiki er mrkuum .s. af er dag, og strfellt verfall ofan hi mikla verfall grdagsins. Eru markair n fallnir niur fyrir upphafsstu eirra sl. viku, annig a hkkun sl. viku er algerlega horfin og gott betur.

Tali er a kvrun um jaratkvi s str hrifattur um verfall dagsins dag!

PS2: a getur veri a a s ekki hgt a halda essa atkvagreislu:

Bruno Waterfield : One reason why there will not be a Greek referendum: a referendum bill must be passed by three-fifths of the Greek parliament and the government's majority has gone or as good as.

"Greek constitution: http://www.hri.artcl50.htmlorg/docs/syntagma/ Article 44 suggests no referenda on fiscal matters. Also needs 3/5ths of parliament. No chance. "

Ef etta er rtt hj Bruno, fellur vntanlega grska rkisstjrnin fyrir vikulok, en krafa tveggja af ingmnnum Pasok flokksinsum kosningar egar hefur skapa vissu um a hvort rkisstj. reynd hefur meirihluta-en orrmur er uppi um a lg veri fram grska inginu tillaga um vantraust.

Fjrmlarherra Grikklands er staddur sjkrahsi, undir rannskn vegna magaverkja - og hann hefur sagst ekki hafa haft nokkra hugmynd um a, a til sti a halda jaratkvagreislu.

etta er v fari a lta t sem einhvers konar rvntingarfullt tspil George Papandreo.

Rkisstjrnin mun vst halda neyarfund kvld.

Fylgjast me frttum!

Kv.


Evrukrsan virist vera lei enn httulegri gr - en ur!

Strfellt verfall var mrkuum Evrpu dag, og eru markair langt komnir me a skila eirri hkkun til baka er var skammvinnu bjartsniskasti sl. viku, kjlfar yfirlsingar leitoga evrusvis sl. fimmtudag um "bjrgun evrunnar".

  • Eftir a hafa hugsa mli - sj markair a essi "bjrgun" er ekki reynd nein bjrgun!

En yfirlsingin um stkkun ESFS (bjrgunarsjs evrusvis) var algerlega innantmt lofor - vegna ess a Evrpa sjlf tlar ekki a leggja fram neitt ntt f ESFS.

ess sta stendur til a leita eftir gvild annarra - .e. a rk lnd rum svum heimsins, skaffi a fjrmagn er upp vantar - litla 800 ma.. yfirlsingu dag sagi Putin a til greina komi a lna 20ma.$ - sem er dropi hafi.

g reikna me v, a ailar markai hafi velt v fyrir sr yfir helgina - gegn hvaa hugsanlegu afarkostum a f myndi fst?

Hvaa afleiingar hefi a fyrir Evrpu a sl sr pening - gegn erfium kjrum ea einhverjum afarkostum af ru tagi?

Og a auki, a augljsa - a langt fr er hgt a sl v fstu a a f fist svona yfirleitt.

N unnt a tmasetja a - hvenr hugsanlega a myndi skila sr fyrir rest.

  • Samkomulagi um lkkun skulda Grikklands, var a auki ekkert sem hnd er festandi.

En a samkomulag, er einungis samkomulag um a prinsipp - a einkabankar skuli afskrifa 50%.

Enn sem komi er, hefur engin bindandi skuldbinding veri frgengin.

Kjti vantar beinin, .e. akkrat hvernig a hrinda slku dmi framkv.

Sast en ekki sst, Grikkland verur me skuldastuna 120% sem var stand Grikklands vi upphaf skuldakrsunnar aprl 2010 ur en Grikkland fkk neyarln, og mjg fir tra v a a s sjlfbr skuldastaa tilviki Grikklands.

Afleiingin af gagnslausu samkomulagi, er hrun tiltrar!

a er .s. stefnir, en egar fstudaginn hkkai vaxtalag talu og Spnar - hressilega.

dag hkkai vaxtalagi enn frekar, fr lag talu 6,12% en sl. fstudag seldi tala skuldabrf fyrir 6,06%.

etta gerist rtt fyrir a Selabanki Evrpu s enn a kaupa brf talu, til a leitast vi a sporna gegn hkkun eirra.

Svo gerist einn atburur dag, .e. hrun strs fjrfestingarbanka: MF Global fjrfestingarbankinn, er orinn gjaldrota, eftir a vst hafa tapa stru vemli.

Btum vi, avrun fr OECD: PRESS BRIEFING ON THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND POLICY REQUIREMENTS FOR G20 ECONOMIES

"if the commitments made by EU Leaders fail to restore confidence and a disorderly sovereign debt situation were to occur in the euro area with contagion to other countries, and/or if fiscal policy turned out to be excessively tight in the United States. OECD analysis suggests that a deterioration of financial conditions of the magnitude observed during the global crisis (between the latter half of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009) could lead to a drop in the level of GDP in some of the major OECD economies of up to 5% by the first half of 2013."

  • eir hafa lkka hagsp sna fyrir Evrusvi niur einungis 0,3%fyrir 2012.
  • Sbr. a hagstofa skalands spir n 0,8% hagvexti skalandi a sama r.

r hagspr gera r fyrir - ath. - bestu tkomu mia vi nverandi stand, og framreikning aan fr, a hruni veri fora.

vert mti benda atburir fstudags og n mnudags til ess, a evrukrsan s n eina ferina enn, lei enn httulegri braut en ur.

  • G20 fundurinn nk. fimmtudag og fstudag Canne, getur reynst mjg hugaverur!
  • Hugsanlega sasti sns fyrir reddingu af einhverju tagi - me asto heimsins.

Ef G20 fundurinn skilar ekki niurstu sem rar standi - hreinlega blasir hildpi vi!

Niurstaa

v miur hafa rki evrusvis og stofnanir ess, algerlega brugist v a lkna a mein sem sfellt versnandi fer innan evrusvis.

a var fyrirsjanlegt, a ef tkoman af fundahldum sl. viku vri vonbrigi - eins og n blasir vi, a myndi a valda enn frekari rleika og hrslu um framtina.

Einungis von um a eitthva tspil komi fram Canne nk. fimmtudag og fstudag, heldur sennilega mrkuum enn uppi - annig a enn strfelldara hrun eigi sr ekki sta.

En ef G20 fundurinn kemur ekki fram me reddingu sem ailar geta fest snar vonir vi, s g einungis hildpi framundan.

Kv.


Stefnir a Evrpa tapi valdastu sinni innan AGS

etta kemur mjg vel fram heimasu AGS, af hverju BRIC (Brasila, Kna, Indland og Rssland) eru ng, en samtmis - gefur etta hugmynd um a hva au lklega tla sr a knja fram.

En skoun atkvavgi innan AGS sbr. listinn a nean, tekinn saman af lista sem sj m heimasu AGS; skrir fullkomlega af hverju svokllu BRIC lnd telja vgi Evrpu innan AGS alltof miki.

  • essa stundina eru a lnd evrusvis nnar tilteki, sem eru vandrum.
  • a er eirra staa v fyrst og fremst, sem er lklega dag gna.

Sj lista af heimasu AGS

Land................Millj. af SDR.....Hlutfall %....................................Fjldi Atkv....Hlutfall atkv. %

  1. Austurrki.......2,113.9.........0.89................................................21,880...........0.87
  2. Belga............4,605.2.........1,94................................................46,793...........1.86
  3. Blgara............640.2.........0.2....................................................7,143...........0.28
  4. Kpur...............158.2..........0,07..................................................2,323..........0,09
  5. Tkkland.........1,002.2.........0.42.................................................10,763.........0.43
  6. Danmrk........1,891.4..........0,79................................................19,655..........0,78
  7. Eistland...............65.2.........0,03..................................................1,393..........0,06
  8. Finnland..........1,263.8........0.53.................................................13,379..........0,53
  9. Frakkland.......10,738.5........4.51...............................................108,126..........4,29
  10. skaland.......14,565.5........6.12...............................................146,396..........5.81
  11. Grikkland..........1,101.8........0.46................................................11,759..........0.47
  12. ngverjaland.....1,038.4........0.44................................................11,125..........0.44
  13. rland...............1,257.6........0.53.................................................13,317.........0.53
  14. tala................7,882.3........3.31.................................................79,564..........3.16
  15. Lettland...............142.1........0.06...................................................2,162..........0.09
  16. Lithen................183.9........0.08...................................................2,580..........0.10
  17. Lxembrg...........418.7.......0.18...................................................4,928...........0.20
  18. Malta...................102.0........0.04..................................................1,761............0.07
  19. Holland.............5,162.4........2.17................................................52,365............2.08
  20. Plland..............1,688.4........0.71................................................17,625...........0.70
  21. Portgal.............1,029.7........0.43................................................11,038...........0.44
  22. Rmena............1,030.2........0.43.................................................11,043..........0.44
  23. Slvaka................427.5........0.18..................................................5,016...........0.20
  24. Slvena...............275.0.........0.12...................................................3,491..........0.14
  25. Spnn................4,023.4........1.69.................................................40,975...........1.63
  26. Svj..............2,395.5.........1.01................................................24,696...........0.98
  27. Bretland...........10,738.5.........4.51..............................................108,126...........4.29
  • ESB 27.................................31,85.....................................................................30,96
  • Evra 17.................................23,2.......................................................................22,43
  • Rest 10.................................8,65........................................................................8,53

Til samanburar:

Bandarkin...........42,122.4.........17.70..............................................421,965...........16.76

  • Bandarkin + ESB.............49,55......................................................................47,72

BRIC lnd:

Kna.....................9,525.9.............4.00................................................96,000............3.81

Indland................5,821.5.............2.45................................................58,956............2.34

Brasila................4,250.5.............1.79................................................43,246............1.72

Rssland .............5,945.4.............2.50................................................60,195...........2.39

Munum a Kna er 1.200 millj. rml. og Indland 1.100 millj. mean Brasila hefur um 200 millj. ba, og Rssland um 140 millj. ba.

svo a skiptingin innan AGS s meir um str hagkerfa, er Kna ori anna strsta hagkerfi heims, og Indland s enn umtalsvert smrra hagkerfismlingu er vxtur ar hraur.

g held a flk hljti a sj, a essi lnd lta vandamlin evrusvinu sem tkifri, til a framkalla rttingu snum hlut innan AGS.

En sendimaur fr Brussel var Kna sl. fstudag, a leitast vi a f ramenn ar, til a leggja fram f til stunings evrusvi.

BRIC lnd eru einmitt fjrsterk - srstaklega Kna sem rur yfir nrri 2/3 af fjrhagsstyrk BRIC landa.

  • Hugmyndir hafa veri uppi meal BRIC landa, a setja upp "special facility" ea srstakann lnssj undir hatti AGS.
  • au myndu leggja fram megni af fjrmagninu - en .s. au eru a fiska eftir eru aukin hrif, og vonast eftir a geta kni au fram.
  • g reikna fastlega me v a BRIC lnd muni leggja fram tillgur snar enn n, fyrir G20 leitogafundinn Canne ann 3.-4. nv. nk. ea nk. fimmtudag og fstudag.

etta getur ori mjg hugaverur fundur - v Evrpu skortir f, til a bjarga sjlfri sr.

ess vegna var auvita sendimaur aan staddur Kna sl. fstudag.

En frttir sl. viku voru mjg villandi, v svo a evrusvi hafi samykkt a stkka ESFS ea bjrgunarsj evrusvis 1.000ma., tlar Evrpa sjlf ekki a leggja fram a fjrmagn.

nstunni vera fulltrar Evrusvis a mjlma rkjum lndum annars staar, um a a lna Evrpu f!

  • En 800ma. vantar upp - svo a ESFS hafi 1.000ma.
  • etta ml, beini evrusvis um fjrframlg annara rkja - verur rugglega meginhitamli Canne rstefnunni nstu viku.

Tkifri BRIC landa er augljst - tkifri sem ekki endilega kemur aftur!

a arf ekki efast um, a au munu heimta sitt mti - og fulltrar evrusvis munu standa frammi fyrir erfiu vali.

Niustaa

S valdastaa sem Evrpa hefur haft innan AGS, getur brtt veri t sgunni. Breytt valdahlutfll einkum me hnignun hrifa Evrpu innan helstu stofnana heimsins, veri ein af lykil afleiingum skuldakrsunnar Evrpu.

Kv.


Part spillirinn tala!

etta er hugaver tilviljun ea kannski ekki, en sl. fstudag fr fram enn eitt skuldabrfa tboi vegum talskra stjv. a sem vakti athygli, var a vaxtakrafan var hrri en nokkru sinni ur ea 6,06%.

etta gerist daginn eftir, a tlun um bjrgun Evrusvis var kynnt til sgunnar me mikli fjarafoki!

Italy gives EU a post-party hangover

  • Myndin a nean snir athyglisvera run - en bakgrunninum .s. ljsbla svi, sst a skuldabrfa eign Selabanka Evrpu vex hratt. Staan er orin a.m.k. 10ma. hrri dag en myndin er mnaar gmul.
  • San m sj mismundandi lita ferla - en taki eftir a llum hinum tilvikunum, reyndi Selabani Evrpu a bjarga mlum, me v a kaupa brf eirra.
  • Eins og sst ef rnt er ferlana, hkkar vaxtakrafan anga til a Selabankinn hefur kaup, lkkar hn sngglega. Srstaklega berandi tilviki Grikklands.
  • San llum tilvikum, hkkar vaxtakrafan aftur - og fer upp fyrir ann kostnaar punkt er Selabankinn hf kaup sn - - san fr vikomandi land yfir bjrgunartlun.

Graphic: Steadily climbing bond yields.

  • En skuldir talska rkisins eru n um 1.900ma..
  • Eins og sst myndinni, lkkai vaxtakrafa talu nokku gst er kaup hfust.
  • En n vantar njustu run - s er salan skv. 6,06% vxtum.

nnur frtt er a:

German economists halve GDP growth forecasts

N er sp af opinberum ailum einungis 0,8% hagvexti skalandi nsta ri.

Niurstaa

Mig grunar a mikilvgum vendipunkti s n fyrir talu. En a hltur a vera umtalsvert slrnt fall n, a sj vaxtakrfu talskra brfa vera kominn aftur upp rm 6%.

Spurning hvort eins og fyrri tilvikum, vaxtakrafan mun han fr halda fram a hkka - uns tala eins og Portgal, rland og Grikkland; voru hrakin af skuldabrfa mrkuum?

---------------------------

En eins og standi er dag, getur ekki Evrpa fjrmagna skuldir talska rkisins. En skv. treikningi hra hagfringa mun a kosta rml. 800ma. nstu 3 r a halda talu floti.

dag er einungis 200ma. og eittva rml. a eftir pottinum bjrgunarsji Evrusvis.

Enn er ar ekkert f til staar umfram etta. Enginn veit enn, hvort a Evrpu takist a sannfra nnur lnd .e. str lnd utan svisins eins og Kna, til ess a lna Evrpu f til a endurlna svo til talu.

Klrt a slk ln vera ekki n einhverra afarkosta.

Mjg langt fr v a bi s a redda evrunni!

Kv.


Stjrnlagadmstll skalands, varstu fyrir lri!

Stjrnlagadmstll skalands hefur flkt mlin a nju fyrir Angelu Merkel. En oktber kom rskurur ess efnis a mikilvgar kvaranir sem skuldbinda sku jina, yru fortakslaust a vera teknar samvinnu vi Sambandsing skalands.

Dmstllinn heimilai a mjg mikilvgar kvaranir - egar tmi vri skammur, rf fyrir skjtar kvaranir, vru teknar af rkisstjrninni - eftir a hafa inga eingngu me Fjrmlanefnd ingsins.

  • a sem san hefur gerst, er a stjrnarsinnar hafa haft form um a skipa srstaka rskurarnefnd skipu 9 ingmnnum, sem gti teki snggar kvaranir.
  • etta er vegna ess, a form eru uppi um a heimila ESFS (bjrgunarsj evrusvis) a kaupa skuldabrf einstakra aildarrkja - lei vandri, til a halda niri eirra vxtunarkrfu.
  • etta vri kvei lokuum fundum nefndar og me leynd.
  • etta virist hluta ingmanna ekki hafa fundist vera ngilega takt vi rskur Stjrnlagadmstlsins, svo eir settu fram kvrtun.
  • Stjrnlagadmstllinn hefur n teki kvrtun formlega fyrir:

German Constitutional Court Halts Special Euro Panel

German court suspends parliament's bailout committee

"A spokeswoman for the Constitutional Court said it would investigate whether the planned use of a small closed-door committee of 9 German lawmakers to consider urgent matters relating to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) infringed on lawmakers' rights."

"The parliamentary leader of Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservative bloc, Peter Altmaier, said the suspension meant parliament's entire lower house would need to decide on urgent matters relating to the EFSF."

"Lawmaker Otto Fricke, a budget expert for Merkel's junior coalition partners the Free Democrats (FDP), said the suspension of the committee made it de facto impossible for the EFSF to buy bonds in secondary markets, as such purchases must be agreed in secret. Germany's parliament cannot meet in plenary in secret."

"A court spokeswoman said a final ruling could come by late December."

Eins og sst a nean - er etta reynd hugaver spurning, sem ingmennirnir tveir hafa lagt fyrir Stjrnlagadmstlinn:

"The politicians have based their complaint on expertise provided by the Bundestag's own research service, which advised that the special panel transfers responsibility to a few and hinders all members of parliament from participating in the shaping of policy."

a getur vel veri rtt hj Otto Fricke a mean Stjrnlagadmstllinn er a rannsaka umkvrtun tveggja ingmanna Sambandsingsins, s ekki unnt a nota ESFS til a kaupa rkisbrf rkja vandrum ea lei vandri.

  • annig a Selabanki Evrpu veri a halda snum kaupum fram.
  • Svo er ekki unnt a fyrirfram gera r fyrir tiltekinni niurstu!


Niurstaa

Stjrnlagadmstll skalands virist hafa teki sr varstu fyrir lri skalandi, rtt Sambandsingsins til a hafa full umr yfir v hvort og a hvaa marki, ska jin er skuldbundin til a astoa nnur melimarki evrusvis.

Kv.


Evrusvi leysir mli me peningum annarra

a er hugavert a lesa samkomulag leitoga Evrusvis fr v gr:


Lausnin - peningar annarra

a er a kaldhna, a stra lofori um stkkun bjrgunarsjsins ea ESFS 1.000ma. byggist peningum annarra. Og peninga er enn eftir a tvega - og ekki ljst hvort eir koma til.

  • En til stendur a ba til einkasj sem ESFS veitir byrg - en aeins fyrir fyrstu 20% af tapi.
  • Einkasj - vegna ess a a er veri a fara svig vi reglur, sem banna a ESFS sjlfur skuldsetji sig.
  • Til stendur san a essi nji einkasjur eigu ESFS, bji skuldabrf til slu - au hafi essa byrg fyrstu 20%.
  • Hugmyndin er a me v a lkka annig httu fjrfestanna - veri essi brf hugaverur kostur.
  • Til stendur a leita til strra aila - t.d. hefur veri rtt v. Knv., rugglega verur rtt vi flr. eins og Indland, Brasilu, Japan, Bandar. jafnvel og AGS. Svo auvita eru eir alveg rugglega til a selja sjum, og rum fjrfestum.
  • Me essu a n fram 800ma.. En dag er eftir cirka 200ma. ESFS.


Vandaml?

  • Alls vst a fjrfestarnir su til etta.
  • Knv. eru lklegir til a setja fram skalista - af skilyrum. rugglega flr.
  • Svo m ekki gleyma v - a me v a gefa essa byrg, er allt einu bi a gerbreyta eli samskipta aildarrkja evrusvis og ESFS, .e. n geta byrgir falli au. En fram a essu, hefur sjurinn enga byrg teki - og sjurinn hefur einungis lna skv. heimild aildarrkjanna, svo engar byrgir gtu falli au nema skv. eirra samykki.
  • Allt einu er etta gerbreytt - og msir hagfr. ttast a etta auki httu a t.d. Frakkland missi "AAA" lnshfi sitt.
  • En Frakkland er a "AAA" land, sem er vikvmustu stunni skuldalega s og efnahagslega.
  • Ef Frakkland m ekki vi miklum fllum. Staa ess er vikvm.
  • En markaurinn a lkum, mun reikna me v a ESFS taki fll - annig a au lendi aildarrkjum, og a getur sett aukinn rsting lnshfi evrusvis-rkja.

Hva me samkomulagi um niurskur skulda Grikklands?

Samkomulagi virist ekki vera bindandi -eingngu samkomulag um a prinsipp a Grikkland skuli f 50% afskrift skulda eigu einkabanka.

Og a s afskrift skuli vera sjlfviljug.

annig s - er etta meir samkomulags grunnur, en endanlegur sttmli. M lkja essu v. frgt samkomulag sem Geir H. Haarde undirritai v. Breta, sem var samkomulagsgrunnur sem nverandi rkisstj. sar meir ntti, sem grunn a Svavars samningnum alrmda.

  • Hi eiginlega samkomulag er enn eftir a tfra.
  • Beinagrindin er komin - n vantar kjti beinin.
  • Eiginlega ekki miki hgt a tj sig - upplsingar enn of ljsar.


Endurfjrmgnun banka!

  • Endurfjrmgnun banka upp 106ma..
  • Bnkum er gefinn frestur til 30. jn 2012, til a hfa eiginfjrhlutfall sitt 9%.
  • Ef einhverjir bankar ra ekki fram essu - kemur til kasta rkissja einstakra aildarrkja, a grpa mli.
  • Einungis komi til kasta ESFS, ef aildarrki telur sig ekki ra vi mli.

Vandaml

  • Miki vantraust hefur rkt milli evr. banka undanfari - og einnig gagnvart evr. bnkum af hendi erlendra banka.
  • Ailar eru v lklegir til a vera tregir til a kaupa eignir - ef evr. bankar vilja selja einhvern hluta starfsemi, ea lnasfn.
  • Af v leiir, a ver eru lkleg til a vera lg.
  • Sama um endurfjrmgnun me hlutabrfatboi, ver brfa hafa veri mjg lg essu ri.
  • Bankar munu v tiltlulega lti f fyrir slk brf.
  • A auki ynnir etta t eignarhluta nverandi eigenda - svo eigendur eru lklega tregir til a fara lei.
  • Verulegar lkur eru v til a bankar - dragi r tlnum.
  • Sem vri mjg samdrttaraukandi - ofan nverandi niursveiflu hagkerfa evr.
  • Auk essa m benda , a ef bankar eru endurfjrmagnair af rkissji aildarrkis - a hkka skuldir ess rkis.
  • Endurfjrmgnun - ef framkv. me eim htti, getur auki skuldakrsu aildarrkja evru.
  • a sama reyndar vi - ef ESFS endurfjrmagnar, en innleysir ESFS byrgir sem aildarrkin hafa veitt, annig a skuldir eirra hkka. Skuldakreppa getur versna.



Niurstaa

Er etta ng? Alveg rugglega ekki!

  • Aildarlnd evrusvis tla sr ekki a leggja fram neitt ntt f.
  • rtt fyrir allann rstinginn.
  • Markair vita v mta vel - a meir f er ekki a f.
  • En Frakkar geta ekki teki sig slkann kostna.
  • jverjar vilja a ekki.

Mli er a reynd er bakstoppi bara eir 200ma. sem aildarrkin hafa lagt ESFS til.

Ekkert meira f liggur enn hendi - og alls vst a a breitist.

Kv.


Veruleikafyrring Gylfa Arnbjrnssonar!

a hafa margir veitt ummlum Gylfa Arnbjrnssonar athygli gegn okkar gjaldmili undanfari, .s. hann er n treka binn a segja evruna klett hafinu sbr. krnuna. N tk steininn r, en n dreymir hann um a rkin kringum okkur su boin og bin til a gefa slendingum strf ri hverju, svo unnt veri a hfa lskjr slandi upp.

Bija um asto vegna krnu

a trlega vi Gylfa er ekki a maurinn s ffl - heldur hve strt ffl!

"ljsi ess a krnan okkar sr ekki vireisnar von og vi blasa gjaldeyrishft um komin r er g eirrar skounar a mikilvgt s a ra millilia laust vi plitska forystumenn helstu rkja Evrpu um beina asto eirra til a treysta stu gjaldmiilsins, hugsanlega me v a tengja krnuna beint vi evruna me stuningi bi AGS og fr Norurlndunum. annig gti almenningur og fyrirtki fyrr noti eirra vaxtalkkana og stugleika sem vi urfum a halda. Vi eigum ekki a lta skammtma vanda evru, dollars og jens villa okkur sn, evran er fyrsta lagi eins og klettur hafinu bori saman vi krnu sem vi bum vi og ru lagi er vandi dollarsins enn meiri en evrunnar ar sem viskiptahalli og halli fjrlgum er tluvert meiri en Evrpu."

g nenni ekki a taka fyrir sbr. hans evru og dollar, en a gefur mjg villandi mynd a taka evrusvi sem heild og bera saman vi Bandarkin sem heild.

Hva arf til a tengja krnu vi annan gjaldmiil?

  1. gerir a ekki nema a afnema hftin fyrst. En draumur Gylfa er a ba til tenginguna fyrst og losa hftin svo. En annig er vanalega ekki stai a tengingum.
  2. a er vegna ess, a til ess a tenging tveggja gjaldmila hafi trverugleika, arf hn a vera gagnvart elilegu markasgengi beggja - .e. jafnvgisgengi beggja. Annars arf stugt a verja fjrhum til a verja tenginguna falli.
  3. arna kemur inn hugmynd hans um asto, en draumur hans virist vera a jirnar grennd og ea AGS, su til a veita okkur beinar peningagjafir. En, krnan er ekki me rtt markasver dag, annars vri htt a afnema hftin n egar og gengi myndi ekki sveiflast. Vi slkar astur mun urfa a verja teninguna me umtalsverum fjrhum, sem hann virist dreyma um a arir borgi.
  • trlegir draumrar.
  • Flk man vonandi enn eftir v, a hinga mun vilja streyma aflandskrnur a umfangi milli 30 og 40% af jarframleislu.
  • Hr er fast bnkum einnig verulegt f - sem tali er lklegt a vilji t.
  • Svo er a krnubrf.

etta allt saman er hann a mynda sr a hinir borgi!

Ori "draumrar" er eiginlega of veikt essu samhengi!

  • Svo nefni g einnig, a ef gengi er hkka eykst innflutningur. a er varasamt vegna ess a afgangur okkar af tekjum egar bi er a greia af skuldum sl. ri var bara 0,3% og skv. Selabanka innan vi 1% essu ri.
  • Me erfia skuldastu, vri ekki gfuspor - a sna yfir viskiptahalla.

Ofurvaxtakjr innan krnu!

"Hann segir a hsnisvextir hr landi hafi veri allt a fimm til sex sinnum hrri en evrusvi ESB s.l. 10 r og rslok 2010 greiddu evrpskir launamenn einungis 3,4% nafnvexti samanbori vi au ofurkjr sem okkur er gert a greia. Ef horft er til kaupa venjulegri 3ja herbergja b ri 2000 hafa hjn meallaunum mtt leggja a mealtali um 12% af rstfunartekjum snum hverju einasta ri aukalega greislubyri lna."

1. Verblga: Verblga er megni til vegna ess, a laun hr eru alltaf hkku vert yfir lnuna: Verslanir hkka ver til a f fyrir hkkunum sns flks, hi opinbera gjld af smu stu - - svo str hluti launahkkana fer beint verlag. Og, etta gerist me nkvmlega sama htti - ef vi vrum me evru, .e. verslanir hkka og opinbera; en verblga er ekkert anna en verhkkanir.

Lnd innan evrusvis eru vntanlega me lga verblgu, vegna ess a au vihafa einhverja lgmarks skynsemi, egar kemur a ger kjarasamninga.

AS sjlft ber arna mikla byrg.


Raunvextir:
Raunvextir eru hir hr tlnum, vegna lfeyriskerfisins - sem ath. hverfur ekki - en g er a tala um vxtunarrf ess upp 3,5% raunvexti, sem a arf a mealtali.

Tengingin er s, a sjirnir eru helstu kaupendur skuldabrfa hr - sl. bankar fjrmagna sig miki me v a selja eim brf. Sem urfa a bera essa vxtun.

  • kemur dmi annig t, a bankarnir lna 3,5% + kostnaur. Vanalega milli 6-7% raunvextir.
  • Eins og g sagi, etta breystist ekki. Sjirnir vera fram til staar. fram megin fjrmgnunarlei bankanna hr.
  • lklegt verur a teljast a sl. bankar geti fengi drari fjrmgnun erlendis.


A auki verur a skoast fjarskalega lklegt a erlendir bankar myndu setja hr upp sjoppu. En bendi a ekki hefur bori hr erlendum matvlaverslana-kejum, lagning matvlaver hr s h. Sama um slu eldsneytir bifreiar - a erlend samkeppni hefur ekki komi til. svo sl. hafi veri melimur a EES san 1994.

  • En sland er einfaldleg ltill markaur - mjg ltill.
  • Hr er srstakt tunguml.
  • Srstk menning.
  • a kostar alltaf tma og peninga a lra ntt markassvi.
  • Hr er eftir of litlu a slgjast fyrir stra erlenda aila - svarar a ekki kostnai a koma sr hr fyrir, flestum tilvikum.

Bankavextir til almennings munu ekki lkka - - .e. einfaldlega ekki rtt, a upptaka evru vri eitthver strt skref tt a meiri lfsgum.

Ef vi viljum lkka vexti hr, arf:

  1. Taka upp meiri skynsemi vi ger kjarasamninga, svo a s ekki svo lengur a hvert sinn hkki verblgan verulega, svo rjungur ea meir af launahkkun, fari verlag. etta hefur auvita hrif bankavexti - a sjlfsgu vill Gylfi ekki sj sk verkalshreyfingarinnar essum vanda. Miklu einfaldara a segja - krnunni a kenna.
  2. arf a endurskipuleggja lfeyriskerfi, svo unnt s a lkka vxtunarrf eirra niur segjum 1.5-2%. Alls ekki meir en 2%. a gt skila lkkun raunvaxta um allt a 1-1,5%.

Gylfi er svo tndur essari umru a a er ekki findi - en taki eftir a hann nefnir skunartn a bankaln fist allt niur 3,5% erlendis, en sjirnir sem hann hefur umsjn yfir taka til sn 3,5%.

etta myndar vaxtaglf slandi - .e. enginn getur boi hrlendi lgri vexti en 3,5% + eigin kostna.

Niurstaa

a er hrilegt a ba vi a, a sti yfirmaur verkalshreyfingarinnar slandi skilur ekki einfldustu hluti um gjaldmiilsml, hva hagfri.

Talar t og suur svo t vellur froan ein.

Kv.


Kristinn H. Gunnarsson - "Ammu borgar"! Svara gagnrni hans hugmyndir Eyglar Harardttur!

Kristinn H. Gunnarsson hefur komi fram sna eigin vrn fyrir vertrygginguna. Kallar a a senda reikninginn til mmu gmlu, r hugmyndir a afnema vertryggingu.

Plan Amma borgar. Kristinn segir blekkingu a vertrygg ln su kjarabt

Hugmynd Eyglar Harardttur er a fra vertrygginguna yfir rki!

etta er hugaver hugmynd, og hn hefur a sumu leiti smu afleiingar og, a taka upp evru.

vsa g til ess, a innan evru getur rki ekki raunlkka eigin skuldir me verblgu. En me v a innlendar skuldir rkisins vru vertryggar, er s hugmynd a me v fi rki mjg flugann hvata, til a vinna gegn verblgu.

dag s verblga nr engin gn fyrir a, vegna ess a ess krnuskuldir eru ekki nema a hluta vertryggar - sbr. vertrygg rkisbrf. getur rki a nokkru leiti minnka sna skuldabyri, me v a framkalla nga verblgu svo r raunlkki.

  • eir sem vera fyrir tjni eru allir eir sem skulda vertrygg ln!
  • Rki sama tma bti stu sna - hvatir su v til staar hj eim sem stjrna Stjrnarrinu a hmarka frekar en hitt verblgu.

etta er ekki n httu!

Alveg eins og upptaka evru krefst byrgrar hagstjrnar - svo a s yfirleitt mgulegt a lta a ganga upp, annars er leiin gltun hr. getur trverugleiki slkrar leiar dala hratt, ef ekki er teki me festu rkisfjrmlum.

En rki gti lent herfilegum skuldavandrum, ekki me svipuum htti og innan evru sbr. tiltekin aildarrki evru vandrum, ef a missir eitt skipti stjrn snum mlum.

En er engin skjt tlei - heldur alveg eins og hj aildarrkjum evru vanda - einungis opin s lei fyrir rki, a skera niur tgjld. Vi tekur margra ra pna fyrir rki, me skertri jnustu v. almenning, eins og vi erum reyndar a sj dag.

Hugmyndin er a - :

  • etta skapi smu hvatir til byrgrar hagstjrnar - og meint er a aild a evru tti a fylgja.
  • Rki er sett spennitreyju - a hefur mti enn stjrn kvrunum vaxta.
  • v betri stjrn eftirspurn innan hagkerfisins - en ef sland vri evru, og kvaranir vaxta vru teknar annars staar - og ekki nokkru samhengi vi astur okkar hagkerfis.


bending til Kristins

Laun aldrara eru reynd skuld hagkerfisins burts fr v hvort .e. gert me sjasfnun ea gegnumstreymiskerfi. Munurinn er fryst og fremst s, a gegnumstreymiskerfi er gegnsrra. En, svo a til su sjir, a hi sama vi - nema v tilviki egar f er varveitt erlendis.

  • Sjirnir eru reynd skuld hagkerfisins vi sjina - eir sem vinna vaxta reynd eignirnar og fyrir vxtun er greiddur t lfeyrir.
  • Vandinn er s a etta kerfi gengur ekki upp nema hagkerfi gangi upp.
  • arf a huga heildarunga vaxtagjalda hagkerfinu - en s byri er a getur bori er takmrku.
.e. hugavert v samhengi er krnan fll um ri minnkuu eignir sjanna minna en nam verfalli krnunnar - en a geru launatekjur launamanna ekki.

etta ir reynd - vegna ess a tekjur allra .e. aldrara sem og launamanna, hvla eim tekjum sem hagkerfi skaffar; a hlutfall eirra tekna sem fara til aldrara hkkai kostna launamanna.
  • annig var hrein raunhreyfing .e. tekjufrsla kostna launamanna, yfir til aldrara.
  • sama tma, hkkuu skuldir launamnna verulega.
  • Tekjuskering launamanna sbr. aldraa er v heilt yfir - mjg veruleg.

Vi getum ekki haft a annig - a nnur kynslin hafi a svo miki verr en hin, v ekki sst a eir sem eru vinnumarkai eru einnig a ala upp nstu kynsl ar eftir. annig a ef kjr eirra vinnumarkai versna berandi meir - - a einnig vi kjr barnanna sem eru a alast upp.

etta arf allt a hugsa samhengi!

Niurstaa

svo vertrygging s afnumin skuldir almennings - er a eingngu skref barttunni fyrir betri skilyrum fyrir almenning. San arf a rast a lfeyriskerfinu, .e. a lkka meal-raunvxtun ess r 3,5%. En essi raunvxtun myndar vaxtaglf hr - heldur uppi bankavxtum hrlendis.

reynd hefi a nr engin hrif raunvexti bankaln hrlendis, a skipta um gjaldmiil.

Kv.


Frbr h greining stum banka- og skuldkrsunnar Evrusvi

Sj einnig fyrri grein: Mjg g greining fr hri einkastofnun vanda evrusvis!

Til a skilja betur greinguna a nean, er best a g komi fyrst me sm bendingu. En hn er s a verlag peningum .e. vextir, hafa mikil hrif allt hagkerfi. g vi, a verlagi peningum hefur mikil hrif a, hvernig eir eru notair. Ekki bara af einstaklingum heldur fyrirtkjum, en ekki bara fyrirtkjum, heldur einnig v opinbera.

  • En v drari sem eir eru - v meira viltu hafa af eim, um lnsf s a ra.
  • v a er svo margt skemmtilegt unnt a kaupa - unnt a gera!

S fr sjnarmii neytenda, hefur lgt verlag peningum eftirfarandi hrif:

A)a letur til sparnaar vegna ess, a lg-vaxtaumhverfi, er lti upp r v a hafa a safna f og f af v rentur .e. vexti. a er einnig tiltlulega hagsttt a spara sr - til a kaupa seinna meir eitthva drt.

B)a hvetur til skuldsetningar, v a eru svo tiltlulega drt fr vaxtakostnai s a kaupa varning afborgunum hvort sem um sjnvarp, bl, tlvu ea hs er a ra. v drari sem lnin eru, v flugari eru hvatirnar til ess a skuldsetja sig fyrir neyslu. annig a v drari sem peningar vera, v meiri verur eftirspurn - hvort sem a er eftir neysluvrum ea hsni.

  • Ef san seinna meir - a verur atburur hvort sem er innan hagkerfisins ea sem kemur a utan, er veldur v a vextir fara sngglega upp - eftir a vextir hafa veri lgir um eitthvert rabil, og lgir vextir hafa veri a hvetja til skuldsetningar.
  • getur ori mjg umtalsver aukning vaxtagjalda hagkerfinu, sem framkallar mikinn samdrtt neyslu, verfall hsni og mrgum rum eignum, samdrtt fjrfestingum o.s.frv.

a framkallar samstundir svokallaa skuldakreppu, sem vi erum vitni a n til dags.

  • a er einmitt punkturinn - - a lgu vextirnir, dra lnsf, sem hvetur til skuldsetningar - - er mjg str hluti stu ess, a til verur skuldakreppa sar meir.

a eru margvslegir kostir vi a stand, a hafa peninga verulega dra.

Spurning um a finna einhvern mealveg - v peningar geta einnig veri helst til of drir!

-------------------------- Stratfor greining:

Europe faces a banking crisis it has not wanted to admit even exists.
In the European mind especially the Northern European mind a handful of small countries that made poor decisions are responsible for the European debt crisis, and while the ensuing crisis may spread to the banks as a consequence, the banks themselves would be fine if only the sovereigns could get their acts together.
  • This is an incorrect assumption.
  • If anything, Europes banks are as damaged as the governments that regulate them.
http://einarbb.blog.is/users/72/einarbb/img/bank_exposure_to_foreign_markets_by_country.jpg

When evaluating a problem of such magnitude, one might as well begin with the problem as the Europeans see it namely, that their banks biggest problem is rooted in their sovereign debt exposure.

The state-bank contagion problem is fairly straightforward within national borders.

  1. As a rule the largest purchaser of the debt of any particular European government will be banks located in the particular country.
  2. If a government goes bankrupt or is forced to partially default on its debt, its failure will trigger the failure of most of its banks.

Greece does indeed provide a useful example. Until Greece joined the European Union in 1981, state-controlled institutions dominated its banking sector. These institutions primary reason for being was to support government financing, regardless of whether there was a political or economic rationale justifying that financing.

  • The Greeks, however, have no monopoly on the practice of leaning on the banking sector to support state spending. In fact, this practice is the norm across Europe.

Spains regional banks, the cajas, have become infamous for serving as slush funds for regional governments, regardless of the government in questions political affiliation. Were the cajas assets held to U.S. standards of what qualifies as a good or bad loan, half the cajas would be closed immediately and another third would be placed in receivership. Italian banks hold half of Italys 1.9 trillion euros in outstanding state debt. And lest anyone attempt to lay all the blame on Southern Europe, French and Belgian municipalities as well as the Belgian national government regularly used the aforementioned Dexia in a somewhat similar manner.

http://einarbb.blog.is/users/72/einarbb/img/holdings_of_sovereign_debts_by_country_-_first_quarter_2011.jpg

Yet much debt remains for outsiders to own, so when states crack, the damage will not be held internally. Half or more of the debt of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Belgium is in foreign hands, but like everything else in Europe the exposure is not balanced evenly and this time, it is Northern Europe, not Southern Europe, that is exposed. French banks are more exposed than any other national sector, holding an amount equivalent to 8.5 percent of French gross domestic product (GDP) in the debt of the most financially distressed states (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Belgium and Spain). Belgium comes in second with an exposure of roughly 5.5 percent of GDP, although that number excludes the roughly 45 percent of GDP Belgiums banks hold in Belgian state debt.

Too Much Credit

Germany has extremely high capital accumulation and extremely competent economic management. One of the many results of this pairing is extremely inexpensive capital costs. When Germans governments, corporations or individuals borrow money, it is accepted as a near-fact that they will pay back what they owe, on time and in full. Reflecting the high supply and low risk, German borrowing rates for governments and corporations have long been in the low to mid single digits.

The further you move from Germany the less this pattern holds. Capital availability shrivels, management falters and the attitude toward contract law (or at least as defined by the Germans) becomes far less respectful. As such, Europes peripheral economies most notably its smaller peripheral economies have normally faced higher borrowing costs. Mortgage rates in Ireland stood near 20 percent less than a generation ago. Government borrowing rates in Greece have in the past topped 30 percent.

With that sort of difference, it is not difficult to see why many European states have striven for inclusion in first, the European Union, and second, the eurozone. Each step of the European integration process has brought them closer in financial terms to the ultra-low credit costs of Germany. The closer the German association, the greater the implicit belief that German financial resources would help them in a crisis (despite the fact that EU treaties explicitly rejected this).

  • The dawn of the eurozone era prompted lenders and investors to take this association to an extreme.
  • Association with Germany shifted from lower lending rates to identical lending rates.
  • The Greek government could borrow at rates that only Germany could demand in the past.
  • Irish borrowers were able to qualify for 130 percent mortgages at 4 percent.
  • It was the perfect storm for explosive banking growth, and it laid the groundwork for a financial collapse of unprecedented proportions.
  • Drastic increases in government debt are the most publicly visible outcome, but it is far from the only one.
  • The least visible outcome is that extraordinarily cheap credit to consumers triggers an explosion in demand that local businesses cannot hope to fill.
  • The result is unprecedented trade deficits as money borrowed from foreigners is used to purchase foreign goods. Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia and Spain all states whose cheap labor when compared to the Western European core should encourage them to be massive exporters instead have run chronic trade deficits in excess of 7 percent of GDP. Most routinely broke 10 percent.
  • Such developments do not directly harm the banks, but as credit costs return to more rational levels and in the ongoing debt crisis borrowing costs for most of the younger EU members have tripled and more consumption is coming to a halt. In the few European markets that demographically may be able to generate consumption-based growth in the years ahead, credit is drying up.

Housing Bubbles

Large volumes of suddenly cheap credit made available to eager consumers obviously generated a series of sizable housing bubbles.

Spains tapping of European credit markets also underwrote the largest housing boom in Europe. More construction projects have been completed in Spain in recent years than in Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom combined. The construction sector both commercial and residential has now collapsed and there are about 1 million homes now sitting vacant in a country with just 16.5 million families. Outstanding loans to various real estate interests total some 400 billion euros, all backed by collateral that has lost 20 percent of its value since the housing market peaked.

In relative terms, Ireland actually did more than Spain. At its peak, nearly 10 percent of Irish gross national product was dependent upon construction, with 70 percent of that purely from residences. Half of the mortgages extended during the Irish real estate boom were made at the peak of the market between 2006 and 2008. That sector remains in the midst of a fairly rapid collapse. Residential home prices have reduced by half since their peak in 2007 and are showing few signs of stabilizing. The Irish government hopes that with their eurozone bailout package, their banking sector will become functional again by 2020. Until then, Ireland in effect has no banking sector and has been financially sequestered from the rest of the eurozone.

Two other European states the United Kingdom and Sweden have both experienced massive increases in home price growth, and both suffered from price corrections due to the 2008 financial crisis. But prices in both markets have recovered smartly, with Sweden even bouncing back above its pre-crisis highs. Sweden, in fact, is still experiencing a massive housing boom, with annual mortgage credit still expanding at a 30 percent annualized rate.

Risks to Recapitalization

Because of the politicized nature of European banking, European governments often require their banks to have a smaller cash cushion than banks elsewhere in the world. For example, when the European Banking Authority ran stress tests in July to prove the banks stability, the banks were only required to demonstrate a capital adequacy ratio (the percentage of assets held in cash to cover operations and losses) of 5 percent half the international standard. Even with such lax standards, eight European banks still failed the tests. Since banks need cash to engage in the business of making loans, there is very strong resistance among European banks to valuing their assets at market values. Any write-downs force them to redirect their free cash from making loans to covering losses.

  • The lower capital requirements of Europe mean that their margin for error is always very thin.

Increasing that margin requires more cash reserves, a process known as recapitalization. Recapitalization can be done any number of ways, but most of the normal options are currently off the table for European banks.

  • The preferred method is to issue more good loans so that profits from new business can eat away at the losses from the bad. But in a recessionary environment, new high-quality loans are hard to find.
  • Banks also can raise money by issuing stock or selling assets. However, few in Europe, much less elsewhere, want to increase their exposure to the European banking sector, largely because of banks gross exposure to Europes sovereign debt crisis.
European banks in particular, which are in the best position to know, are reluctant to become more entangled in each others affairs and often shy away from lending to one another, even for terms as short as overnight.
  • Even in good times, any serious recapitalization efforts would flood the market with stock shares and assets for sale. These are not good times.
  • Remember that banks are the primary purchasers of European sovereign debt and Europe is already in a sovereign debt crisis.
  • Adding more assets for banks to buy would create the near-perfect buyers market: rock-bottom prices.
There are indeed some would-be purchasers Sweden from within the European Union and Turkey and Russia from without but their combined interest adds up to merely billions of euros, when hundreds of billions are needed.

Which brings us to the sheer size of the problem. The Europeans are leaning toward a new regulation that would force all European banks to have a capital adequacy ratio of 9 percent, hoping that such a change would decisively end speculation that Europes banks face problems. It will not.

  • According to the European Banking Authority, the institution that is responsible for carrying out stress tests, two-thirds of Europes banks are currently below the 9 percent threshold and that assumes no past or future reduction in the value of sovereign bonds for any European governments, no new sovereign bailouts that damage investor confidence or asset values, no mortgage crisis, no new bank collapses in Europe akin to that of Franco-Belgian bank Dexia and no renewed recession. Simply increasing capital adequacy ratios to 9 percent will cost about 200 billion euros (about $270 billion).
  • The regulation also assumes that all European banks have been scrupulously honest in their reporting; Dexia, for example, shuffled assets between its trading and banking books to generate a misleading capital adequacy ratio of 12 percent, when the reality was in the vicinity of 6 percent.
Forcing the banks to have a thicker cushion is certainly a step in the right direction, but the volume is insufficient to resolve any of the problems outlined to this point, and the latest rumor out of Europes pre-summit negotiations is that perhaps only 80 billion euros is actually needed.

If the banks cannot recapitalize themselves, the only remaining options are state-driven recapitalization efforts. Here, again, current circumstances hobble possible actions.

  • The European sovereign debt crisis means many governments are already facing great stresses in meeting normal financing needs doubly so for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Belgium and Spain.
  • No eurozone states have the ability to quickly come up with several hundred billion euros in additional funds. Keep in mind that, unlike the United States, where the Federal Reserve plays a central role in bank regulation and remediation, the European Central Bank has no role whatsoever.
  • The individual central banks of the various eurozone states lack the control over monetary policy to build the sort of highly liquid support mechanisms required to sequester and rehabilitate damaged banks.
  • Such central bank actions remain in the arsenal of the non-eurozone states the United Kingdom, for one, has been using such monetary policy tools for three years now.
  • However, for the eurozone states, the only way to recapitalize is to come up with cash and as Europes financial crises deepen, thats becoming ever harder to do.

The EFSF

There is one other option that the eurozone states do have: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), better known as the European bailout fund, which manages the Greek, Irish and Portuguese bailouts. With its recent amendments, the EFSF can now legally assist European banks as well as European governments. But even this mechanism faces three complications.

  1. First, the EFSF has yet to bail out a bank, so it is unclear what process would be followed. The French have indicated they would like to tap the facility to recapitalize their banks because they see it as being politically attractive (and not using just their money). The Germans have indicated that should a bank tap the facility then the sovereign that regulates the bank must commit to economic reforms; the EFSF, therefore, should be a last resort. Not only is there not yet a process for EFSF bank bailouts, but there also is not yet an agreement on who should hold the process. Even if the Germans get their way on the EFSF, remediation and supervisory structures must first be built.
  2. Second, the EFSF is a very new institution with only a handful of staff. Even if there were full eurozone agreement on the process, the EFSF is months away from being able to implement policy. And if the EFSF is going to have the ability to restructure banks, that power is, for now, directly in opposition to EU treaties that guarantee all banking authority to the member-state level.
  3. Finally, the EFSF is fairly small in terms of funding capacity. Its total fundraising ceiling is only 440 billion euros, 382 billion of which it has already committed to the bailouts of Greece, Ireland and Portugal over the course of the next three years. Unless the facility is significantly expanded, it simply will not have enough money to serve as a credible bank-financing tool.
To handle all of the challenges the Europeans are hoping the EFSF will be able to resolve, STRATFOR estimates the facility will need its capacity expanded to 2 trillion euros. Finding ways to solve that problem likely will dominate the European summits being held during the next few days.

---------------------------------------Endir greiningu Stratfor

a getur veri varasamt fyrir hagkerfi, a lenda allt einu lgvaxtaumhverfi! Sem vant er hvaxta!

  • Eins og fram kemur greiningu Stratfor, hafa jverjar lengi bi lgvaxtaumhverfi.
  • eir eru v ornir v vanir!

a m segja a jverjar hafi lrt a lifa me lgum vxtum! a er eim freystingum, sem v fylgir.

En allt anna er uppi teningnum, egar j sem vn hefur veri hrri verblgu - hum vxtum - og a auki, verulega miklum stugleika gengismlum og hagstjrn; er allt einu flutt yfir lgvaxtaumhverfi.

  • a sem kom fyrir S-Evrpu og rland, m lkja vi algunarsjokk!

Me vissum htti m lkja essu vi .s. oft er sagt a sumt ftkt flk veri fyrir er a vinnur lotti, .e. a tapar ttum.

  • a skapaist allsherjar neyslui - tja, alveg eins og hr slandi sl. ratug.

a er einmitt .s. er svo hugavert samanburinum, a a sem gerist hr og a sem gerist S-Evrpu og einnig rlandi; er svo fjandi keimlkt.

A auki erum vi me mjg sambrilega hagsgu og S-Evrpurkin, .e. stugleiki + verblga en breytileg milli ra + hir vextir.

Eins og sagt er - ef a kvakar eins og nd, ltur r eins og nd, labbar eins og nd - er a lklega nd.

Punktur, g vill meina a lkur su mjg - mjg miklar, a vi hefum fari mjg lkt af okkar ri.


etta var allt fyrirsjanlegt - svo hagstjrnendur ttu a geta brugist vi tma!

Stjrnvld ttu a geta s etta fyrir - .s. ef vextir lkka mjg miki, um lei ir a a lkur eru strfelldri aukningu eftirspurn eftir lnsf. Vegna ess, a eim mun fjlga miki sem taka neysluln - eir sem kaupa hseignir munu taka strri ln og kaupa strri eign, fleiri munu hafa efni a taka ln - o.s.frv.

  • a tti a vera algerlega fyrirsjanlegt - a vi mikla vaxtalkkun myndi vikomandi hagkerfi fara eftirspurnar trb.
  • a var einhvern veginn eins og rkjandi hugmyndafri blindai hagstjrnendur fyrir httunni.

S hugmynd var tbreidd - v miur vegna ess a hn er andskotans rans della - a innan evru myndi viskiptahalli milli aildarrkja svisins ekki skipta neinu mli - v var vtkt tra a slkt jafnvgi myndi sjlfleirttast - markaurinn myndi sj um mli.

a var sem sagt nokkurs konar harlnu markastr - og efasemdarrddum var gjarnan svara einhvern veginn ann veg - a benda a a skipti ekki mli hvort Kaliforna vri me viskiptahalla v. Washington.

g veit ekki hvort essi tr er sta ess, a stjv. rkja S-Evrpu + rlands, brugust ekki vi me nokkrum sjanlegum htti, til a takmarka run er kni stuga aukningu viskiptahalla og skuldasetningar hagkerfanna t vi. En hi minnsta er a mguleg skring a um hafi ri blind delga.

En upptaka evru breitir ekki grunnstareindum jhagfri - .e. a ef hagkerfi skuldar t vi, arf a hagkerfi a hafa afgang af viskiptum vi nnur lnd - hvort sem skuldin er vi lnd utan ea innan svis. Breitir engu svo skuldin s evrum.

a er a sama skapi ekkert dularfullt af hverju fjrfestar eru a tapa tiltr getu svaxandi fjlda aildarrkja evrusvis, til a endurgreia skuldir - - einfalt, 3 r eru liin kreppu, og enn eru mrg eirra me viskiptahalla.

Viskiptahalli ir a tt reynd ekki fyrir v sem skuldar - elilega sna eigendur skulda einhverja bilund ur en eir tapa tiltr - - > en a eru liin 3 r og enn eftir ann tma, eru f teikn uppi um a au smu rki er enn hafa viskiptahalla, munu geta framkalla visnning br.

  • vert mti, virast horfur einmitt slkum visnningi fara sfellt minnkandi.
  • g er ekki bara a tala um Grikkland, Portgal, Spn og talu. Einnig um Frakkland og Belgu.

raland er eina landi af eim sem lent hafa alvarlegum vandrum - sem tekist hefur a framkalla slkann visnning. Kllum a undantekinguna sem sannar regluna!

En reglan virist vera - - > a evran hindri nausynlegu hagkerfis algun sem arf a fara fram!

a a var til krsa er ekki llu leiti evrunni a kenna!

Ef hagstjrnendur hefu ekki veri blindair af eirri hagfri, a allt myndi sjlfleirttast innan evrunnar. hefu eir geta brugist vi - v sem tti a vera ljst fyrirfram hva myndi gerast, egar land var flutt r hvaxtaumhverfi yfir lgvaxta.

OK, evran tekur vaxtastki af hagstjrnendum - annig a a skilvirka tki til a stra eftirspurn er ekki til staar.

  • En a hefi veri unnt a hkka skatta - t.d. virisaukaskatt umtalsvert. S skattur dregur r neyslu, a s sur skilvirk lei en a beita vxtum.
  • Rki gat reki sig afgangi, dregi r sinni starfsemi - minnka umsvif.
  • Hgt a auki hefi veri, a krefja innlenda banka um aukna eiginfjrbindingu - aukna lausafjrbindingu, til a draga r lnsf.
  • Auvita gtu rkin ekki beitt slku erlenda banka me tib v landi. Svo slkar agerir hefu alltaf haft takmarkaa ingu.

g er samt ekki viss a svo allt hefi veri gert af rkisstj. eirra landa til a hgja - a hefi a duga til, vegna ess hve uppsveiflan sem var fyrir hrifin af lgu vxtunum var sterk.

En a raunverulega er dltill galli a geta ekki strt vxtum - egar veri a a leitast vi a halda aftur af eftirspurn.

En delgsk blinda hagstjrnenda - var klrt mevirkandi ttur.

------------------------

Eitt er vst a evran hamlar mjg rkin snum agerum vi a a berjast vi krsuna.

  • Eins og tskrt af Stratfor geta rkin ekki beitt eigin selabanka me sama htti og rki sem hefur eigin gjaldmiil og sinn selabanka algerlega eitt. .e. selaprentunarvaldi til ess a triggja a ngt lausaf s til staar bnkum starfandi landinu, sbr. ager Federal Reserve sem hefur keypt skaplegt magn af verlausum eignum af bnkum Bandar.
  • Eina leiin sem rkin hafa innan evrusvis - er a leggja beinhara peninga banka vandrum.
  • En .s. selaprentunarvald er milgt, hvert rki einungis takmarka magn af fjrmagni, skv. skmmtun.

Og ef rki sjlft er egar mrkum ess a eiga lausaf fyrir eim skuldbindingum er egar hvla v, vandast mli all hastarlega - ef bankakrsa vofir yfir.

Er einhver tlei r nverandi stu?

Mn skoun er a r su afskaplega far!

  • Ef aildarrkin setja auki fjrmagn ESFS (bjrgunarsj evrusvis) vi a aukast eirra skuldbindingar - annig aukast lkur a lndum vanda fjlgi. ESFS geti veri sjlfsur orsakavaldur a "contagion" .e. dmn hrifum.
  • a sama tel g gerast ef eins og n stendur til, a ESFS er breytt byrgarsj. En fram a essu hefur hann veitt ln ekki byrgir. Sjurinn hefur ekki byrgst neitt af skuldum landanna vandrum. annig jir sem hafa veitt f ESFS fram a essu, hafa ekki bori gegnum hann byrg skuldum landanna vandrum. a a skapa slka byrg - getur valdi v a vibtar skuldbindingar falli rkin sem eru melimir ESFS. annig auki eirra httu. Auki lkur dmn hrifum meal eirra.
  • Ef honum hefi veri breytt banka, eins og Frakkar lgu til - gat a gengi upp. En aeins ef Selabanki Evrpu baktryggi dmi me fullu prentunarvaldi. hefi ekki skapast neinar vibtar skuldbindingar fyrir melimarki ESFS. v hefi fylgt lklega veruleg peningaprentun og v aukin verblga. jverjar hafa blokkera lei.
  • Ef einstk aildarrki endurfjrmagna banka, aukast eirra skuldir. Skuldakrsa aildarrkjanna versnar og mjg lklega vegna ess sem tskrt er af Stratfor hve evr. bankar eiga miki af skuldum aildarrkjanna, lenda menn aftur sama sta og ur, .e. ntt verfall verur skuldabrfum aildarrkja og fjrmgnunarholan bankakerfinu minnkar ekki.
  • Ef ESFS sr um mli, dreifist skuldbindingin um aildarrkin, en a einnig eykur skuldir aildarrkja vikvmri stu, magnar httu dmn hrifum vegna aukinna skuldbindinga gegnum ESFS.
  • jverjar hafa blokkera baktryggingu Selabank Evrpu ESFS.

Svo er a Grikklands messi - sem nr engin lei er a sj hvernig geti enda vel!

Niurstaa

Mr lst virkilega hrmulega stuna Evrpu. g segi eins og sast a skrsta leiin - s lei massvrar preningaprentunar. egar v sleppir virist nnst allt vera hrun af einu tagi ea ru.

er eiginlega spurning um hva gerist G20 fundinum Canne ann 3-4. nv. nk. En s fundur getur ori sgulegur. Svokllu BRIC lnd (Kna, Indland, Brasila og Rssland) hafa nefnilega nefnt mguleikann bjrgun Evrpu, me milligngu AGS.

Ef eins og n er tlit fyrir a a tspil sem leitogar Evrpu koma fram me Evrpu nstu viku bersnilega hvergi nrri dugar til, virkilega er mguleiki mjg sgulegum G20 fundi.

En v m treysta a fleira mun hanga sptunni en a eitt a veita Evrpu risastr neyarln, egar fjrmagni kemur megni til fr BRIC.

Mr dettur hug a BRIC lnd geti mjg vel hugsa sr breitt valdahlutfll innan stofnana t.d. AGS. au lklega munu sj tkifri egar Evrpa liggur killiflt, til a n fram varanlegum breytingum valdahlutfllum.

Evrpa getur veri eirri bjargbrn - a tapa me varanlegum htti, eirri valdastu sem hn enn fram sustu r hefur vihaldi.

a verur merkilegt "legacy" fyrir evruna!

Kv.


Bjrgun evrunnar virist ysta barmi ess a mistakast!

a eru 2. meginvandaml sem hafa flkt mlin essari viku. a fyrra er a Frakkland sjlft fkk avaranir fr Moodie's og Standards&Poors, ess efnis a Frakkland myndi vera fellt um matsflokk, ef a tekur sig umtalsverar vibtar skuldbindingar.

Hitt er a ska ingi hefur allt einu rust fram vettvang fjljlegra stjrnmla, og ar var rkisstjrn Angelu Merkel settur stllinn fyrir dyrnar - a er ingi neitai a veita Merkel opinn vxil um a semja vi Frakka, um a hvernig tti a tfra a a skuldsetja ESFS.

Assertive Bundestag takes centre stage

etta ddi a Merkel var ekki lengur me fullt samningsumbo!

ska ingi virist n stra virum milli Frakka og jverja!

annig standa ml n - a ska ingi krefst ess n, a sj samkomulagi ur en a heimilar rkisstjrninni a ganga fr v.

etta er afleiing nlegs dms Stjrnlagadmstls skalands, en s setti strng skilyri um tttku ska ingsins kvrunum sem skuldbinda sku jina.

etta er sta ess a fundur Merkel og Sarkozy sunnudaginn nk. verur ekki fundur .s. kvaranir vera teknar!

v n getur Merkel ekki handsala neitt formlegt samkomulag - nema me fyrirvara.

etta getur reynst hugaver breyting - en etta ir mjg lklega a Merkel verur bundin ba sk.

  • En a lkindum gerir etta a nr algerlega tiloka - a skaland samykki nokkra raunverulega stkkun ESFS! g vi, me vibtar fjrmagni.

Ef vi samtmis hfum huga erfia stu Frakka - er reynd af borinu a stkka ESFS me njum fjrframlgum.

  • skaland vill ekki leggja frekar fjrmagn pkki.
  • Frakkland getur a ekki.


ESFS verur ekki a banka!

Frakkar hfu gert sr vonir um a Merkel myndi samykkja, a ESFS myndi vera gerur a banka. Fjrframlag rkjanna vri eigi f - en t a myndi hann geta lna margfalt hrri upphir, alveg eins og bankar gera. stainn vri hann eins og arir bankar baktryggur af Selabanka Evrpu.

  • jverjar hafna essari lei alfari, og eftir a ska ingi hefur n rust fram, er ljst a s lei er endanlega dau.

er enn uppi borinu a sjurinn bji byrgir - .e. 20% af upph. Vegna ess a ekki er eftir nema cirka 200ma. ESFS dugar 20% - frilega s - ekki nema til a byrgjast 1.000ma..

eru a aildarrkin sjlf sem baktryggja. En einungis fyrir upph sem til staar er sjnum.

  • Hugmyndin virist vera s a etta dugi sem eldveggur gagnvart lklegu gjaldroti Grikklands.

Enn virist einungis gert r fyrir hugsanlegu roti Grikklands, og hugmyndin virist a 20% trygging dugi til ess, a ra fjrfesta er eigi skuldabrf landa eins og Portgals, talu og Spnar.

En miklar efasemdir eru uppi um a, a 20% trygging dugi til a ra fjrfesta!

gangi samhlia virum um ESFS eru virur um Grikkland

EU looks at 60% haircuts for Greek debt

Greek myths and documents

a virist hafa veri kvei a opna aftur samkomulagi um ara bjrgun Grikklands fr jl. En jverjar krefjast ess a einka-bankar samykki a afskrifa bilinu 50-60%, ekki 21%.

a verur mjg hugavert a sj, hvernig skpunum jverjar og Frakkar, sja saman plan ar sem einkabankar - af fsum og frjlsum vilja - afskrifa a hlutfalli mun hrra en 21%.

En enn er tala um "voluntary cuts" sem hljmar vgast sagt mjg trlegt a unnt veri a knja fram - n rstings sem myndi ekki gera dmi "voluntary" ea sjlfviljugt.

En sta ess a enn a reyna vi sjlfviljugar afskriftir - er a enn er veri a reyna a sleppa vi a a framkalla svokallaann "cretid event" .e. a matsfyrirtki gefi skuldum Grikklands "D" ea "Default" einkunn - - > en mun urfa a greia t svokallaar skuldatryggingar .e. "CDS - Cretid Default Swap".

Slkt hefur ekki gerst ur - en etta er tali lklegt til a skapa mjg mikinn ra aljlegum mrkuum, .e. ekki sst a menn ttist a markaurinn muni telja etta fordmisskapandi, og fyrir bragi lta svo a lkur lnatjni vegna fleiri aildarrkja ESB, hafi aukist, vaxtalag hinna rkjanna muni hkka -- annig lkur dmn hrifum vaxa.

En eins og g sagi, eru mjg miklar efasemdir uppi um a, a 20% byrg dugi til a ra slkar efasemdir - srstaklega vegna ess a markaurinn veit, a ekki er a vnta frekari fjrframlaga ann sj.

----------------------

Skv. frtt Reuters segir AGS a Grikkland urfi 60% afskrift skulda svo unnt veri a n fram sjlfbrri skuldastu: Greece may need 60 percent bond writedown; EU at odds

frtt FT kemur fram a kostnaur vi uppihald Grikklandst ratuginn, geti fari 444ma. skv. nju mati AGS.

essi skrsla "debt sustainabilty analysis" virist endanlega slkkva vonum eirra, er hldu a a vri mgulegt fyrir Grikkland a hafa sig sjlft t r feninu, n afskrifta skuld.

Mr snist vgast sagt trlegt a a muni takast a n saman um svo flki heildrnt samkomulag svo stuttum tma - .e. skuldaafkrift fyrir Grikkland og nrri tfrslu ESFS.

Niurstaa

a er ekki flknara, en a ef a nst ekki a n saman sannfrandi samkomulagi nstu viku. verur allt voa.

Sennilega verur af einhverskonar samkomulagi, me miklu "fanfair" en a verur a skoast sem fjarskalega lklegt - a a samkomulag sem n virist kortunum, dugi.

er tlit fyrir a G20 fundurinn ann 3-4 nvember, geti ori all sgulegur. En ef allt stefnir voa, verur mjg mikill rstingur fr rkjum heim um a, a Evrpa samykki utanakomandi asto.

Slk verur a sjlfsgu ekki n skilyra. a vri eitthva lei, a um eitthvert rabil vri sjlf Evrpa me verulega skert efnahagslegt sjlfsti.

Kv.


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Einar Björn Bjarnason

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Einar Björn Bjarnason
Einar Björn Bjarnason
Stjórnmála- og Evrópufræðingur. Áhugi á stjórnmálum, Evrópumálum, alþjóðamálum, málefnum Miðausturlanda, trúmálum, vísindum og tækni, og margt fleira.
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